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The working paper compares and contrasts the macroeconomic performance of
the New Zealand and Finnish economies over the entire post-WW2 period.  It
notes that Finland has gradually overtaken NZ in terms of GDP per capita,
productivity performance and export performance.  Finland suffered a severe
recession in the early 1990s (the deepest affecting any western industrialised
economy in the Post WW2 period).  Very high growth rates since 1994 in
Finland may partly be ascribed to cyclical rebound from this recession, with
much of the remainder driven by rapid growth in the telecommunications giant
Nokia.  Finland also faces some particular policy challenges: high structural
unemployment, medium term fiscal pressures from an ageing population and
impediments to the growth of small and medium sized enterprises.
The paper shows that differences in economic performance between New
Zealand and Finland cannot simply be ascribed to contrasting policy
approaches. Cultural and geographical differences, and historical antecedents
have also played a role.  There may be lessons to learn from Finland’s
approach to education and R&D policy.  The Finnish approach of experimenting
with different policy settings and carefully evaluating their effect is also
instructive.  In most other respects, Finland’s economic strategy bears a close
resemblance to that of New Zealand.TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT........................................................................................................ 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS..................................................................................... 2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................... 4
Comparative Performance.......................................................................................................................4
Different Routes of Economic Diversification........................................................................................5
Nokia – an Important Element.................................................................................................................6
The Education System.............................................................................................................................6
R&D and Industry Policy........................................................................................................................7
Policy Evaluation.....................................................................................................................................8
Consensus Building and Social Capital...................................................................................................8
Liberalisaton and Integration...................................................................................................................8
Policy Challenges....................................................................................................................................9
Can Small Countries Aspire to High-technology Leadership?..............................................................10
Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................11
MOTIVATION AND OBJECTIVES .................................................................. 13
COMPARING FINLAND AND NEW ZEALAND.............................................. 15








Collapse of Eastern Trade......................................................................................................................28
Trade .........................................................................................................................................................29
Exports by Region.................................................................................................................................33
Composition of Export Industries..........................................................................................................36








High-technology Firms in Small Countries...........................................................................................53
Social Capital in Finland .......................................................................................................................55





























10. Administration of Industrial Policy.........................................................................................84
11. Development of the Service Sector.........................................................................................84
12. Small and Medium-sized Enterprises......................................................................................84
13. Agriculture and Forestry .........................................................................................................85
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS............................................................... 86
Comparing Finland and New Zealand...................................................................................................86
Elements of Finnish Economic Strategy................................................................................................87
Industry policy.......................................................................................................................................88
Policy making and social capital ...........................................................................................................88
APPENDIX 1:  FINNISH AND NEW ZEALAND GROWTH RATES................ 90
APPENDIX 2: FINNISH INHERITANCE AND GIFT TAXATION..................... 91





New Zealand and Finland share some common characteristics – both countries
are small, open economies, with similar populations, similar land masses and
resources, and comparable average incomes.  This makes Finland an
interesting comparison country for New Zealand, particularly given the fact that,
in the years since the Second World War, it has successfully transformed itself
from a low-tech, resource-based economy into a high-tech, high value-added
economy.
Having started the post-war era well behind New Zealand in terms of average
national income, Finland is now ahead. Given the different paths of the two
countries and the Finns’ considerable success in developing high value-added
industries, one of the main focuses of this working paper is to examine the role
of government policy in the development of these industries.
However, country comparisons are always difficult.  There are significant
differences between any two countries and it is difficult to judge which policies
from Finland are worth replicating in New Zealand. For example, one significant
difference between the two countries is geographic: Finland is well integrated
into the wider European economy and, importantly, has European Union
membership. The Finns have also proved adept at taking advantage of their
proximity to Russia, especially during the Cold War years. New Zealand, on the
other hand, is by far the world’s most isolated industrialised country.
The comparison certainly provides compelling evidence that an appropriate mix
of location, available resources, human capital and policy settings is crucially
important – and that adopting Finnish policy without careful thought about the
other pre-conditions of success is unlikely to achieve such impressive results. In
fact, one of the most striking characteristics of Finnish public policy is the very
careful thought given to how it can help different industries and sectors, such as
in its agricultural policy (see page 82).
Comparative Performance
Finland started the post-war period considerably behind New Zealand in GDP
per capita.  However, during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s its economic
performance improved as resources were moved from agriculture into industry
and services, unleashing higher productivity growth. Solid growth in Finland
(and weaker than average growth in New Zealand) has seen the Finns enjoy
higher average incomes than New Zealanders since about 1980.
In the European context, Finland has been an average performer for most of the
post-war period, with its GDP per capita matching the European average until
1979.
During the 1980s Finland briefly enjoyed above-average European income
levels, but economic difficulties and a major recession brought it back to the5
pack with a bump in the early 1990s.  This massive recession – the largest to hit
any industrialised country since the Great Depression – has dominated
Finland’s recent past, driven by a bursting asset price bubble and, to a lesser
extent, a collapse in trade with the Soviet Union.
Finland’s growth since 1994 has averaged around 5% per annum, but mostly
because of a cyclical rebound.  Growth is expected to soon slide back to a more
sustainable level.
In the post-war period before the 1990s’ recession, Finland enjoyed greater
macroeconomic stability than New Zealand.  Output growth was less volatile,
which may have encouraged Finnish investment and contributed to rising
income levels.  (Note that although this working paper has not established the
reasons for this less volatile growth, the macroeconomic environment is likely to
have played a part. Future research could focus on comparing the relative
importance of terms of trade effects and fiscal and monetary policy.)
Different Routes of Economic Diversification
After World War II Finland owed the Soviets substantial reparations, which it
paid in metal and engineering products. As a result, it developed a strong
manufacturing base in ship-building and engineering. During the same period,
New Zealand was doing very well out of feeding a recovering Britain and was
slower to diversify. It is likely that these different pressures caused the two
countries to produce different sets of goods, seeding different sorts of
industries.
Both New Zealand and Finland have since diversified their exports, and New
Zealand’s story may be the more dramatic. In Finland, the forestry industry and
its related offshoots have remained strong, joined by metal and engineering
products and an especially notable period of recent growth in the
telecommunications sector.
Considerable diversification has occurred in New Zealand since the dismantling
of import controls and agricultural subsidies and the introduction of tariff
reductions.  In 1960 some 92% of New Zealand’s exports were of pastoral
origin; in 1996 that figure was down to 36%. Although New Zealand has not
achieved a growth in GDP per capita to match Finland’s, the theme of export
diversification is possibly more important in New Zealand than in Finland
because of the greater initial homogeneity.6
Nokia – an Important Element
The success of Finland’s telecommunications giant Nokia explains a substantial
share of Finland’s overall growth in the 1990s.
Nokia’s telecommunications business took off in 1992, had net sales of US$8
billion in 1998 and has enjoyed staggering growth of 25% per annum since
1994.  The Finnish Institute of Economics (ETLA) estimates that the electronics
equipment industry added 1.5% to annual real GDP growth during 1998 and
Nokia alone accounted for 1% of real GDP growth
1. Nokia’s development
provides insights into factors that may be responsible for Finland’s overall
performance.
Nokia’s present success dates to its strategic decisions to invest in leading-
edge research and development (R&D) in the 1960s and 1970s. The
groundwork for telecommunications was laid in the 1960s when the company
researched the field of radio transmission in its electronics department. In the
late 1970s, mobile phones and telecommunications infrastructure products were
developed for both domestic and international customers.  Nokia invested in
digital technology when it was in its infancy.  These decisions, followed by a
continuing strong commitment to R&D, allowed Nokia to develop and maintain
its competitive edge.
The policy environment was another factor driving the development of an
internationally competitive Finnish telecommunications industry:
·  Deregulation (competition among telephone system operators and with
foreign suppliers of telecommunications equipment to the Finnish market)
put pressure on Nokia to continually develop its businesses and products.
·  Finnish policy insisted that technical standards meet internationally accepted
norms.
The upshot was that Finnish suppliers were ready to service a growing
international market, at a time when potential competitors (eg Motorola) were
cocooned within domestic regulatory environments and not producing systems
compatible with worldwide requirements.
The Education System
The growth of high-technology firms such as Nokia and its affiliates has so far
not been hampered by a shortage of the necessary engineering and other
technical skills.
The Finns do well in standard international literacy and quantitative competency
comparisons. Their education system follows the traditional Northern European
model of streaming students into either vocational training schools or upper-
                                           
1 OECD Economic Surveys: Finland, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Paris, 1999, p20.7
secondary schools, which prepare them for university.  There is fierce
competition for the most popular university courses, allowing universities to
maintain high entrance standards.
This study has not assessed Finland’s education model in detail, but there may
be something to learn from the way it funds and manages its compulsory
education sector.  However, it should be remembered that educational results
are produced by the interaction of family mores, individual attributes and formal
training.  As in all inter-country comparisons, it is difficult to disentangle the
effects of cultural differences (for example, do the Finns place more importance
on education excellence than many New Zealand families?) from the
performance of the education system.
The Finns are concerned with shortages in graduates with commercial and
entrepreneurial skills.  They are also concerned that the system is not
responsive enough to employer needs and that bottlenecks in the tertiary
system are encouraging students to spend too long on courses that are not
preparing them well for job opportunities.
R&D and Industry Policy
Nokia’s history shows that telecommunications liberalisation early in Finland’s
history played a significant role in the growth of its high-technology sector.  The
Finns have also recently reformed other elements of their industry policy, but
still believe there is a role for government in industry.
That said, the Finnish Government has slashed state aid to business over the
last decade and focused the remaining subsidies on intangible assets such as
R&D.  It believes that without some government support for these activities
Finland will lose valuable spill-over effects.
Much of Finnish industry assistance policy is based on risk-sharing between the
Government and businesses.  For example, businesses wanting to access
government R&D grants must pay at least 50% of the costs. If the project meets
appropriate criteria, the Government then contributes a share of the necessary
funds.  Public spending on R&D did not play a major role in Nokia’s
development, although the company did forge strong links with university
research institutions in the 1960s and 70s and thus indirectly benefited from
government spending.
The recent emphasis on risk sharing with private R&D ventures may help
Finland to maintain its lead in high-technology developments.  The Finnish
Government certainly views this policy as an investment for the future.
However, it is too early to categorically review its effect.8
Policy Evaluation
The Finns seem eager to stand back and evaluate policy so that they can
minimise errors, with their approach to R&D an interesting example. A high
premium is placed on evaluating the success or otherwise of their policies.
Consensus Building and Social Capital
Consensus building appears to be another feature of Finland’s policy – and
especially political – landscape. The parties forming the Government regularly
represent more than 70% of Finnish voters, which probably enables them to
debate policy subtleties in a more sophisticated way than is possible in more
adversarial systems. High social capital or trust is likely to be a significant
feature.
Social capital, with attributes such as the level of trust and co-operation
between individuals and groups in society (including between businesses), is
one suggested explanation for the high income levels in Nordic countries.  Most
measurements of social capital place these countries at the top of international
comparisons. It may be that homogeneity, egalitarianism or some other cultural
phenomenon drives this more in Scandinavia than in other small countries such
as New Zealand.
Higher levels of trust and co-operation may help in the transfer of knowledge
between firms in an industry and thus explain the degree of innovation and
rapid diffusion of know-how in Nordic countries.
Liberalisaton and Integration
Finland has pursued trade liberalisation since the 1950s and had low levels of
protectionism for some time.  Finland had a special trading relationship with the
Soviet Union and did not gain European Union membership until 1995.
However, Finland has always had strong trade relationships with the rest of
Europe (through the Nordic Council since 1951, and the European Free Trade
Association from 1961)
2, and has been quick to enter newly emerging markets
in the Americas and Asia. Finland joined with the other Nordic countries to
harmonise domestic regulations in such areas as telecommunications.
Finland’s long history of outward orientation and emphasis on harmonising
domestic regulations with other countries appears to explain some of its recent
export led economic success, especially telecommunications.
                                           
2 Padma Desai, Going Global: Transition from Plan to Market in the World Economy, 1997
Uni/Wider, p274.9
Policy Challenges
The future poses some serious policy challenges for the Finnish Government in
two areas:
1.  An emerging fiscal crisis if current macroeconomic imbalances are not
addressed.
2.  Signs of a lack of dynamism in the Finnish business sector.
Fiscal pressures
The 1990s recession in Finland has left a legacy of government debt, which has
ballooned from 10% of GDP in 1989 to 63% in 1998.  As a consequence the
Finnish Government has made fiscal consolidation a priority.  Expenditure cuts
moved the fiscal position from a deficit of 7% of GDP in 1993, to a surplus of 1
½ per cent in 1998.
However, the structure of government spending in Finland will make it
increasingly difficult to balance the budget.  Finland has one of the world’s most
generous pay-as-you-go pension schemes and is also facing more serious
demographic pressures than any industrialised country other than Japan and
Germany.  The costs of paying for its pension system, combined with increasing
pressure from the rest of the welfare system, are likely to produce a major fiscal
headache over the next decade (unemployment is running at 10% and the
Finns are concerned about a developing ‘welfare culture’).
The Finnish tax system does not provide much room for revenue raising as a
potential solution to these fiscal pressures.  The Finns follow the classic Nordic
model of very high income taxes, with a top marginal rate of 65%. Finland’s
capital taxes are similar to New Zealand’s for foreign investors, but impose a
higher tax burden on Finnish investors owing to high wealth and gift taxes.
Finns are unlikely to want to raise their capital taxes owing to concerns about
capital mobility.  The alternative would see an increasing tax burden on wage
and salary earners, which may not be considered sustainable.
A problem with entrepreneurship?
Finnish authorities express some concern that their history and culture have not
supported entrepreneurship. This is because the large-scale industrialisation
that has taken place over the past 50 years has often been associated with
large, often government, firms.  A culture of “going out on your own” does not
seem to have developed to the level the Finns would have liked.
They are particularly anxious about the number of small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) in Finland – that there are not enough of them and that
costs are very high for small businesses (in compliance and in employers’ social
security contributions
3). This situation probably arose out of Finland’s post-war
                                           
3 Both unemployment and social security are partially funded by employers.10
industrial structure, where large firms and a large public sector dominated
employment, and unions – representing the interests of workers – sat across
the table in negotiations.
The result seems to have been that SMEs were for some time left out of the
policy loop, and only in the recent past have Finnish authorities been seeking to
make it easier for these firms to do business.
The Finns see SMEs as fundamental to the country’s economic performance,
so the Ministry for Trade and Industry and the Council for SMEs have been
working to help these businesses in start-up, growth and operation by reducing
compliance and labour costs, reviewing the implications of the tax code for
SMEs and improving financing arrangements for small businesses.
Can Small Countries Aspire to High-technology Leadership?
Could New Zealand follow Finland’s example and develop a vibrant, high-
technology industrial structure?
On one level, the Finland experience suggests that anything is possible - and
that the route New Zealand might take to reach that goal is unpredictable.  After
all, in liberalising telecommunications in the 1880s, Finnish policy makers could
not have predicted the rise of the mobile phone giant Nokia a century later,
even though this was an important precondition!
However, interpreting high-tech firms such as Nokia as an exception rather than
the rule of Finnish and Nordic experience suggests a different vision for New
Zealand’s future.  It might indicate that New Zealand could prosper through
innovative production, processing and marketing of low to medium technology
products.
Recent research by a consortium of Nordic academics (Maskell et al) on the
economic structure of small, open Nordic economies concludes that small
countries are destined to support largely low to medium technology industries.
There is evidence that much of the innovation in small countries tends to be
process innovation or innovation focused on exploiting niche markets.
4
Some evidence suggests that New Zealand is following a low to medium
technology path. A recent export survey conducted by Infometrics and the
Treasury, which focused on innovation, showed that although many products
produced in New Zealand for export may not be high-technology, the processes
used to produce them often use state-of-the-art, innovative processes.
                                           
4 Maskell et al.11
Conclusion
In the end, it is hard to say whether Finland’s recent success in high
technology– was a fortunate accident, or the product of a different policy and
cultural environment.  There may be lessons to learn from Finland’s approach to
education and R&D policy.  In particular, the Finnish approach of experimenting
with different policy settings, and carefully evaluating their effect is instructive.
In most other respects, Finland’s economic strategy bears a close resemblance
to that of New Zealand.  This suggests that differences in economic
performance between New Zealand and Finland are driven more strongly by
cultural and perhaps geographical features, and historical antecedents, rather
than contrasting policy approaches.12
He forged the Sampo with skill:
on one side there’s a corn mill
on the second a salt mill
a money mill on the third.
And then the new Sampo ground
and the bright-lid rocked;
ground a binful at twilight –
one binful to eat
another it ground to sell
And a third to store at home.
The Kalevala, 10:413-422.13
MOTIVATION AND OBJECTIVES
This verse from the Finnish medieval epic poem ‘The Kalevala’ captures the
original motivation for this paper.  Like the mythical ‘Sampo’ Finland’s rapid
growth in the 1990s conjures up the image of a magical money mill.  What
generated this apparent success story?  Is it consistent with Finland’s earlier
economic performance or does it represent a significant break with the path?
Finland and New Zealand have much in common. They are both small countries
with similar populations, land areas and population distributions.
5 They both
have small, open economies and are enthusiastic traders.
This report discusses the experiences of Finland as a small, export-oriented
economy that has grown faster than New Zealand since World War II. Finland
started the post-war period slightly poorer than the OECD average, and
considerably poorer than New Zealand. Since then however, it has steadily
improved its position in GDP per capita relative to the OECD average, while
New Zealand’s performance has been quiescent since the 1970s.
Over this period Finnish growth has generally been solid.  However, it was
punctuated by something of a roller-coaster ride in the early 1990s when a
credit-driven boom and bust cycle, exacerbated by the collapse of bilateral trade
arrangements with the Soviet Union, led to a massive recession.  This was
followed by an impressive export-led recovery which has seen GDP growth
average around 5% per annum since 1994.
This recovery has accounted for many of the more spectacular features of
Finland’s recent economic history. The growth of Nokia Corporation and its
affiliates accounts for many of the rest.
The purposes of this report are to:
·  examine Finland – as a small, open, export-oriented country on the fringes
of Europe – in light of its strong post-war performance
·  compare the Finnish experience with that of New Zealand.
However, a word of caution: it is not possible to establish a genuinely
counterfactual situation for New Zealand, as we cannot line up a set of 1950s’
New Zealands, tweak policy and observe the differences – and that is really the
only way to compare policy settings scientifically. As a result the comments and
conclusions in this report are necessarily impressionistic. Comparing two
countries is fraught with a number of difficulties, and it is impossible to
disentangle the fortuitous from the inevitable, or the general from the
idiosyncratic.
                                           
5 In both Finland and New Zealand the bulk of the populace live in the most “equatorial” parts of
the country.14
Having said that, it makes sense to try to glean something from the experience
of other countries that face similar challenges to our own. It would be foolish to
think that other countries have nothing to teach us, or that economic theory and
Aristotelian reflection alone are all we need.
This study focuses on understanding Finland’s post-war history and comparing
it with New Zealand’s, examining the relative performance of the two countries.
Industrial policy is of particular interest in this study, as the Finns have adopted
– and are enthusiastic about – a quite different approach from that followed by
New Zealand.
After a brief introduction to geographic factors, the report compares the growth
records of Finland and New Zealand, provides a brief economic history of
Finland and discusses changes in productivity in the two countries. Causes of
the Finnish recession are presented and discussed, as this provides the
backdrop for most recent policy initiatives. Evidence indicates that recent
Finnish growth has been cyclical. The report then discusses issues around
trade.
A sectoral breakdown is conducted for both countries, in which the theme of
export diversification comes through strongly. In Finland much of the 1990s’
growth in exports has occurred in high-tech, high value-added sectors, while
these sectors have been slower to develop in New Zealand.
The report then moves on to discuss government policy in Finland, with a brief
overview of monetary policy, followed by a slightly longer discussion of
Finland’s fiscal policy. As with New Zealand, superannuation, welfare, health
and education are the largest slices of the public cake, and these are generally
dealt with briefly, although education is explored a little more deeply because of
its relevance to human capital (often cited as a reason for Finnish success).
Labour market and tax issues are dealt with before the report turns to consider
the Finnish Government’s industrial policy in some depth. Various aspects are
highlighted and contrasted with New Zealand’s policy settings.
Finally, a discussion and set of conclusions are offered, mindful of the cautions
presented earlier in this section.15
COMPARING FINLAND AND NEW ZEALAND
Finland has always been a buffer between the competing influences of
Protestant Sweden and Orthodox Russia. Even though Finland gained its
independence in 1917, its modern history has still been dominated by its Nordic
and (until recently) Soviet neighbours. If New Zealand sometimes feels that
isolation is its defining geographical characteristic, Finland’s has been the
opposite – a surfeit of sometimes prying neighbours.
These pressures have continued to affect Finland throughout the 20th century.
The Finns are justly proud of their successful resistance against Soviet
aggression during the Second World War, although by entering the war as a co-
belligerent of the Nazis they found themselves in an awkward position in
international affairs: not only did they owe the Soviet Union some US$226
million in war reparations, they came under threat of direct Soviet intervention in
the form of military occupation, and indirect intervention in the form of Soviet
political agitation.
In 1948 the Finns signed the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual
Assistance with the Soviet Union, which provided the basis for Finnish relations
with its eastern neighbour throughout the Cold War. This approach gave the
English language a new verb – to Finlandize, which the Shorter Oxford
Dictionary defines as to “induce (a country) to adopt a policy of benevolent
neutrality towards the Soviet Union”. This policy prevented Finland from joining
the European Economic Community or the Council of Europe on the grounds
that the Soviet administration considered these organisations antithetical to its
interests.
Foreign policy considerations like this have shaped most of Finland’s dealings
with the rest of the world over the last 50 years. Although culturally and socially
Finland has more in common with the Nordic countries to its west, geopolitical
considerations have limited its political freedom.  It is only since the collapse of
the Soviet Union that Finland has been able to consider full membership of the
European family.
While Finland welcomed the foreign policy freedom associated with the demise
of the communist bloc, the collapse of the Soviet Union occurred at a bad time
and was one of the factors triggering Finland’s massive economic crisis in the
early 1990s – when real GDP contracted by around 13% and unemployment
reached 18%. Finland has recovered remarkably well from this recession – one
of the worst in an industrialised country this century, including the Great
Depression.
Aside from the very different political histories of the two countries, New
Zealand and Finland share a lot in common.  This is why Finland is, like Ireland,
a reasonable country with which to compare New Zealand (see Table 1). The
countries have similar populations, geographical areas, resource bases and
standards of living. In terms of average income the countries are similar,16
although Finland is now slightly ahead. Both countries have export-oriented
open economies, although the product mix is quite different.
Given the similarities between the two countries it is worthwhile to examine the
Finnish experience and compare it with our own.
However, it is important to note one major difference between the two countries:
location. Figures 1 and 2, centred on Helsinki and Wellington, demonstrate this.
The radii of the circles are the same in each case. Within the circle centred on
Helsinki there are 39 countries and approximately 300 million non-Finnish




These graphs are obviously a little facetious – if we widen the radii enough,
both will contain the same number of people – but they do illustrate the









9 Helsinki              539,000
Espoo                200,834
Tampere            188,726
Vataa                 171,297
Turku                 168,772
Oulu                   113,567
Auckland         1,057,100
Wellington          345,500
Christchurch       337,200
Hamilton             164,600
Napier-Hastings 115,700
Dunedin             112,800
Table 1
                                           
6 National Geographic Atlas.
7 Penn World Tables.
8 Statistics Finland, Statistics New Zealand.
9 Statistics Finland, Statistics New Zealand.18
FINLAND AND NEW ZEALAND SINCE WORLD WAR II
Output
Gross Domestic Product
At the end of the Second World War the economies of Finland and New
Zealand headed on somewhat divergent paths. While New Zealand sought to
feed an ailing post-war Britain (as well as itself), Finland set about repairing its
infrastructure, which had been damaged by three separate conflicts throughout
the war. In addition, Finland owed US$226 million in reparations to the Soviet
Union
10, most of which it paid in finished product exports from its metal and
engineering industries. Although the foundations of these industries had been
established before the war, the reparation process helped them develop and
take their place alongside the traditionally powerful forestry industry.





































Figure 3  Source: OECD, Penn World Tables
The already strong forestry industry focused on Western Europe, while the
nascent shipbuilding and engineering industries sold to the East via five-year
bilateral trade agreements in which metal products, textiles and clothing were
exchanged with the Soviet Union for oil.
World market prices for oil affected the volume of Finnish exports, and declining
oil prices in the 1980s were the first warning of the fragility of Finland's trade
with its eastern neighbour. Although this system of trade ultimately collapsed at
the beginning of the 1990s, there is evidence that it was a profitable
                                           
10 Finland is the only European country to have repaid its war reparations.19
arrangement for Finland – that the prices it obtained for its goods were a little
higher than it would have received had it sold them to the West. In addition, a
guaranteed Soviet market meant that Finnish exporters could shift production to
this market when other countries suffered recessions in the 1980s, and to some
extent this helped smooth Finland’s economic trajectory.
New Zealand, by contrast, experienced weaker, more volatile growth through
the 1970s and 1980s, with a prolonged period of weak growth from 1987 into
the early 1990s. Solid growth reappeared in the mid-1990s but declined towards
the end of the decade because of the Asian crisis.
GDP Growth
Figure 4 and Table 2 show annual growth rates for Finland and New Zealand,
which are then averaged over longer time periods. It can be seen that –
generally – New Zealand’s growth has been more volatile than Finland’s, about
a lower mean.
Since 1961 New Zealand has grown at an average rate of 2.5%, while Finland
has grown at around 3.4%. Most of New Zealand’s growth occurred between
































Figure 4    Source: OECD
                                           
5 Presenting the situation in this way may make things seem a little more extreme than they
really were – 1974 was a high water mark for New Zealand, so choosing it as an end-point
exaggerates the story a little.20
Finland achieved moderate growth in the 1960s and strong growth in the early
1970s, before succumbing to the general malaise in the late 1970s. However,
its experience in the late 1970s was not as bad as that of many countries – this
is because the bilateral trade deals with the Soviet Union supplied Finland with
oil that was not subject to many of the price fluctuations associated with oil from
OPEC during this period.
Finland posted a growth rate of 3.5% during the 1980s – accelerated towards
the end of the decade by a credit-driven boom – before the combination of a
credit crunch and the collapse of the Soviet Union plunged the economy into
recession in the early 1990s. Subsequent growth has been strong, although
much of it has been a bounce-back phenomenon.
Figure 5 shows the annual growth rates for GDP per capita. This is slightly
different from Figure 4 as population growth is incorporated in the economy’s
annual performance.





































Figure 5   Source OECD, Penn World Tables
Annual growth rates for Finland and New Zealand are provided in Appendix 1,
while Tables 2 and 3 below show average growth rates for the two countries for
periods since 1960. Since 1975 the only period when New Zealand’s growth
has been higher than Finland’s for any extended period was during the early
1990s.21










Considering the post-war period as a whole (Table 3), Finland has grown faster
than New Zealand by a comfortable margin.









Figure 6 forms one of the prime focuses of this report. In 1950 New Zealand
was clearly a long way above the OECD average
12 in terms of national income,
with Finland slightly below average. New Zealand continued to enjoy higher
than average national income throughout the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s,
coming back to the pack with a bump in the mid-1970s.
Since 1974, New Zealand’s performance has been considerably weaker than
most – it was not until 1984 that New Zealand managed to beat its 1974 per
capita income level in real terms. Since then, growth has continued to be weak
– between 1972 and 1992 its per capita income hovered between US$10,000
13
and US$11,500. Over the same period, the average OECD income improved
from US$8,860 to US$12,190, an increase of around 38%.
                                           
12 This is not strictly an average over the entire OECD. Countries that have joined the OECD in
the 1990s have been excluded from this comparison.
13 1985 US dollars.22
Figure 6    Source: OECD, Penn World Tables
Finland, although a little behind the average in terms of per capita income in the
1950s and 1960s, had by 1970 basically closed the gap. Although the Finns
tended to oscillate around the OECD mean through the 1970s, their income
accelerated in the 1980s and by 1989 had moved about as far above the OECD
average as New Zealand’s was below it.
However, Finland’s bubble burst in 1990 and its dramatic effects can be seen at
the extreme right of Figure 6. The Finnish economy has since picked up and the
Finns are now again above the OECD mean in national per capita income.
In the European context, Finland has been an average performer for most of the
post-war period and its GDP per capita matched the European average until
1979.  Finland briefly enjoyed above-average European income levels during
the 1980s before economic difficulties and the recession brought it back to the
































































Figure 7    Source: OECD, Penn World Tables
However, if we restrict our attention to the three large Nordic countries
(Sweden, Norway and Denmark) we see (Figure 8) that Finland has generally
been poorer than its immediate neighbours. However, there has not been a





















































Figure 8    Source: OECD, Penn World Tables
Population
New Zealand’s population has grown much faster than Finland’s since the war.
New Zealand’s 1990 population was 1.92 times its 1950 population, while the
corresponding ratio for Finland is 1.27.
This has implications for the relative economic performances of the two
countries.  Since GDP per capita is a common measure of economic welfare,
New Zealand’s comparatively rapid population growth means that the
denominator of this variable has been growing faster than Finland’s
denominator. This means that New Zealand has to achieve greater net growth
rates than Finland if it is to maintain parity in terms of GDP per capita.
Additionally, if this growth is the result of a higher birth rate (as opposed to
higher levels of immigration) the age profile will differ between the two
countries, with New Zealand’s being more heavily weighted towards younger
people. This may give rise to systematic income differences between the two
countries because younger people usually earn less than older people.
This is consistent with the situation in New Zealand and Finland.  Annual net
migration to New Zealand has averaged around 5000 since the turn of the
century, and for the post-war period accounts for only a small fraction of the
1.6% per annum growth in New Zealand’s population. Most of the population
growth in New Zealand is owing to high birth rates, and this may mean that


















































































































Figure 9   Source: OECD, Penn World Tables
Productivity
Macroeconomic data from 88 countries are compared in Bosworth et al (1995).
Although the paper focuses on comparing the growth rates of different parts of
the world (East Asia, industrialised countries, Africa, etc), it tabulates the growth
rates of the individual countries, including Finland and New Zealand.
The methodology employed a combination of growth accounting and regression
analysis. The study found that increases in total factor productivity had been
remarkably small in industrialised countries and that the accumulation of capital
– physical and human – had contributed most of the observed growth. Bosworth
et al de-composed the growth records of these countries into four contributory
factors:
1.  Output per worker
2.  Physical capital
3.  Education
4.  Factor productivity.
According to Bosworth et al, Finland and New Zealand have the following





1960-70 4.7 1.6 0.5 2.5
1970-80 2.6 1.0 0.9 0.7
1980-86 2.1 0.7 -0.2 1.6
1986-92 2.4 1.4 -0.2 1.2
Table 4   Source: Bosworth et al.




1960-70 1.2 0.5 0.1 0.6
1970-80 0.6 0.6 1.2 -1.2
1980-86 1.7 0.6 -0.1 1.3
1986-92 1.3 1.0 -0.1 0.4
Table 5   Source: Bosworth, et al.
The growth in output per worker in Finland is higher than New Zealand in every
period considered, as are factor productivity and physical capital.
The OECD Economic Outlook gives annual percentage changes in total factor
productivity (TFP) for the periods 1960-73, 1973-79 and 1979-97 (see Table 6).
Period Quantity Finland New Zealand Small Country
Average
1960-73 Total factor prod. 4.0 1.3 2.8
1960-73 Labour prod. 5.0 2.1 1.1
1960-73 Capital prod. 1.4 0.6 1.3
1973-79 Total factor prod. 1.9 -1.5 5.0
1973-79 Labour prod. 3.2 -1.1 3.1
1973-79 Capital prod. -1.6 -1.9 -2.8
1979-97 Total factor prod. 2.6 1.0 1.3
1979-97 Labour prod. 3.5 1.3 2.6
1979-97 Capital prod. 0.2 0.8 -1.2
Table 6   Source: OECD Economic Outlook (June 1998)
These values are a little different from those in Bosworth et al, but they show
similar relative trends: Finland’s TFP has been higher than the industrialised
small country (in this case OECD) average throughout the period considered,
and New Zealand has a worse than average record. Because this data finishes
in 1997, it captures the Finnish recession and recovery. Again Finland
outperforms both New Zealand and the industrialised small country average.
In the last period considered, Finland’s average annual change in TFP is only
bettered by Korea and Ireland. These three countries have experienced the27
same basic TFP story for the same basic reasons: the creative replacement of
old, low-tech modes of production by new, high-tech modes of production has
essentially changed the industry structure in each of these countries.
Recent History
Finland achieved a solid growth rate between the mid-1970s and late 1980s,
averaging 3.2% per annum in 1976-89.  However, the dominant feature of the
Finnish economic landscape of the last two decades is the recession in the
early 1990s.
Causes of Recession
This recession had several causes, both domestic and external:
·  Financial liberalisation in the mid-1980s created a set of incentives for
people to become heavily indebted (for example, Finns faced negative real
interest rates on housing through tax incentives and low bank lending rates).
·  The collapse of bilateral trade with the Soviet Union at the start of the 1990s
exacerbated the emerging Finnish crisis: exports to this region dried up,
precipitating a dramatic rise in unemployment.
·  Following this shock from the East, Finland’s growth rate plummeted –
bottoming out at more than -7% – with output decreasing by around 13%
between 1989 and 1993. Domestic demand contracted substantially in
response, imports plummeted and the Markka (the Finnish currency) fell by
around 30% between 1989 and 1993.
Domestic Considerations
Financial liberalisation, especially the deregulation of the banking sector,
created a credit-driven consumption and investment boom and an associated
asset price bubble.
In spite of some increase in the average household real disposable income,
private investment and consumption responded quickly to the economic slump,
contracting by over 4% in 1991. House prices fell sharply, leading to substantial
contraction in the construction industry (one of the hardest hit throughout the
recession).  Gross residential construction declined by 7% in 1990 and 22% in
1991. This decline arose from the need for financial consolidation owing to the
high level of household indebtedness.
Business investment also decreased during the recession. The number of firms
operating at full capacity dropped and stocks of finished goods were at their
highest levels for almost a decade. A sharp decline in corporate saving reduced
the availability of internal finance.28
Corporate leverage had risen to historically high levels following financial
deregulation: the ratio of gross corporate debt to GDP tripled between 1986 and
the early 1990s. High real interest rates (approximately 10%) also added to the
stress on corporate earnings.
These factors combined with falling demand and increased spare capacity to
seriously constrict the corporate sector.
Collapse of Eastern Trade
Finland’s bilateral trade arrangements with the Soviet Union came to an end at
the end of 1990.
The system was based on five-year agreements with quotas balancing imports
and exports. Imports consisted primarily of oil, purchased by Neste, Finland’s
state-owned oil company. Exports, coming from a range of private firms, were
more varied.
The linking of exports to the oil price meant that the bilateral agreement acted
as an automatic stabiliser, partly shielding the Finnish economy against oil
shocks. Finland also seemed to price its exports under these agreements
slightly more highly than it would have been able to on the international market.
The collapse had both demand and supply aspects:
·  Demand – the rapid deterioration of the Soviet economy suddenly reduced
demand for (perhaps slightly over-priced) Finnish goods. In addition, the
collapse of the bilateral trade agreements allowed Soviet importers to use
the revenue from exports to Finland to purchase goods from other countries.
·  Supply – Finnish exporters became reluctant to export to the Soviet Union
on the grounds that the end of the trade agreements increased their risk by
removing Soviet state guarantees.
With the Soviet market offering weak profit opportunities and increased risk,
Finnish exporters began to look elsewhere for markets. However, traditionally
strong markets such as Britain and Sweden were also experiencing recessions,
although the unification of Germany did offer some opportunities.
So while other markets were stagnant, trade to the East deteriorated
significantly (by some 65%), and the total decline in manufacturing exports in
1991 amounted to more than 8%.
The textile industry was the heaviest hit, with few new opportunities presenting
themselves and a large reduction in trade to the Soviet East leading to a decline
of around 30% in 1991.
Over-capacity and cyclical weaknesses also hurt the forestry and engineering
industries, the export shares of which fell by around 10% and 7% respectively.29
The chemical and food industries, however, were relative success stories.
Despite weaknesses in Western markets Finnish exports expanded even before
the devaluation of the Markka and subsequent export-led recovery.
Year Timeline of the Finnish Recession
1986 ·  Bank lending rates deregulated. Financial deregulation
begins.
1987 ·  Financial deregulation combined with preferential tax
treatment of housing fuels a credit boom that lasts until the
end of the decade. This boom is built on high levels of
household and corporate indebtedness.
1989 ·  Asset price bubble bursts towards the end of the year.
·  Soviet economy deteriorates as political crisis deepens.
1990 ·  Bilateral trade agreements with the Soviet Union – in place
since 1948 – collapse.
·  Finnish exports to USSR decline by 65%, leading to an 8%
decline in total exports.
·  Soviet Union disintegrates politically.
·  Finnish economy goes into recession.
1991 ·  Western European markets in recession.
·  Unemployment doubles from 3.5% to 7%.
·  Finnish output contracts by 7.1%.
1992 ·  Currency depreciation of 12% over 1991-92.
·  Markka floated in September 1992, generating a devaluation
of 8%.
1993 ·  The peak of the recession.
·  Unemployment peaks at 19%.
·  Finnish output has contracted by 13% on the 1990 level – the
largest recession in an industrialised country since the 1930s.
1994 ·  Following strong export growth, Finnish output begins to
expand by the end of the year.
Table 7
Trade
Finland and New Zealand have traditionally exported and imported similar
proportions of their economies.
In 1960 New Zealand exported 22.0% of GDP
14, while Finland exported 22.5%.
Even by 1985 New Zealand and Finland were virtually level-pegging in the
export share of their economies – New Zealand exported 30.8% of GDP while
                                           
14 Historical Statistics, OECD, 1997.30
Finland exported 29.6%. Since then New Zealand’s ratio has hovered around
30%, while exports in Finland have boomed – since the recession – to nearer
40%.
Finnish exports and imports have grown at a faster rate than New Zealand’s.
Since 1961 New Zealand imports and exports have grown at an average annual





































































Figure 11   Source: OECD31
The actual volumes of imports for Finland and New Zealand are plotted in
Figure 10, with exports in Figure 11. New Zealand’s performance since the
Asian crisis shows up at the far right of these graphs, finishing on a weaker note
than Finland. (Of course, if the series had ended in 1995, the outlook would
have looked worse for Finland and better for New Zealand.)
The difference in trade data is presented in another way in Figures 12 and 13,
where natural logs of trade are presented for the same period (1961-98). In
addition to a vertical separation, there is a difference in slope, which attests to
the consistently faster growth rate of Finnish exports and imports.


























Figure 12   Source: OECD
This can be seen in a variety of ways.  The lines can be seen as separated by a
vertical step, corresponding to a time-invariant wedge in the coefficient of the
exponential export (or import) function.  Alternatively, the lines could correspond
to an enduring temporal wedge, with New Zealand being on essentially the
same track as Finland, with a 5-10 year delay.
The second interpretation is encouraged to some extent by Brian Easton’s
discussion in In Stormy Seas, in which he sees New Zealand as having
transformed itself from a quasi-Argentine economy to a quasi-Finnish
economy
15, in that despite the differences in average annual change in exports
and imports (the slope of the logarithmic series) New Zealand has diversified its
exports dramatically over the last two decades.  In 1958
16 pastoral products
accounted for 93.3% of New Zealand’s exports. In 1996
17 the pastoral share of
exports was down to 36%.   In Finland, wood and paper accounted for around
                                           
15 In Stormy Seas, p9-10.
16 Source: New Zealand Yearbook 1960.
17 Source; Statistics New Zealand Monthly Merchandise Trade data.32
69% of exports in 1960
18.  Although this share has declined as other industries
have grown, the higher initial homogeneity of exports in New Zealand is likely to
mean that export diversification has played a greater role in New Zealand than
in Finland. Clearly, it takes time to build expertise in new fields and this process
of “getting up to speed” in new export industries may account for a part of New
Zealand’s post-war economic story.
New Zealand’s exports were about as “diversified” (in the sense of the share of
commodities in total exports) in the late 1970s as Finnish exports in 1960.
Although only an impressionistic statistic, this supports the view that New
Zealand is following a quasi-Finnish path, with a time-lag of around 15 years.
However, this view obscures several salient features of both countries’ post-war
trade stories:
·  Finland’s liberalisation of trade arrangements in the 1960s and 1970s, and
New Zealand’s slower moves towards doing this.
·  The shock to Finland’s trade at the end of the Soviet era and the shock to
New Zealand’s trade by Britain’s accession to the European Community.


























Figure 13   Source: OECD
The wedge between Finland’s and New Zealand’s trade stories is widening in
exports faster than in imports. In the aggregate series, the shock of the early
1990s appears greater in Finland’s import sector than it does in exports, with
imports dropping from about US$2.5 billion in 1990 to about US$1.5 billion in
1993-94. The drop in export values was approximately half this magnitude,
although the “bounce-back” has been in the order of US$1.5 billion.
                                           
18 Source: Finnish Foreign Trade Statistics.33
























Figure 14   Source: OECD
This has led to an interesting shift in Finland’s net export position. Whereas
New Zealand has remained near zero in net export terms, the early 1990s
recession precipitated what appears to be an enduring change in Finland’s
trading profile.  This can be seen in the net exports figure, in which the Finnish
track departs from “near zero” during the early 1990s, accelerates until around
the end of 1993 and then stays approximately constant at around US$0.8
billion.
Exports by Region
Since the Second World War, the bulk of Finland’s trade has been with
countries that now comprise the European Union.
In fact, in spite of Finland’s placatory policies towards the Soviet Union and its
allies, Finland’s share of trade with Western Europe has actually dropped since
the end of the Cold War. This is largely the result of Finland’s expansion into
other markets; Figure 15 shows that Finland’s exports to other industrialised
countries have grown about three-fold since 1970.
The former Soviet Union consumed a large proportion of Finland’s exports (21%
in 1980), and Finland lost a lot of this market when the Union collapsed. Exports
to Russia still comprise around 8% of all its exports, but this is significantly
down on Cold War figures. However, exports to other former members of the
Soviet Union have grown. In particular Finland has been developing an
interesting and fertile relationship with Estonia, its nearest Baltic neighbour.34
Figure 15  Source: Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, Finland.35
Figure 16   Source: Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, Finland.
Figure 16 shows a more resolved picture of the destination of Finnish exports,
and plots the annual changes in the export shares of Finland’s top four export
destinations for the last 10 years.
The rapid collapse – and subsequent mild recovery – of eastern trade is the
most dramatic feature, but also evident is the gradual diminution of trade with
Britain, Germany and Sweden. This is the result of increased trade with North
America and, especially, Asia through the period of very high growth in that
region before 1997. Export prospects to this region have weakened and Finnish
exports are not expected to increase at the same fast rate – 11% per annum
19 –
as since 1994.
                                           
19 Economic Survey 1998, Finnish Ministry of Finance.36
Composition of Export Industries
Finland’s exports by industry in the period since the Second World War tell an
interesting story. Over this period the metals and engineering industry has
increased its share of the export sector enormously – an approximately five-fold
expansion in 37 years. Consequently, the shares of the other export industries
have contracted in relative terms, with the exception of the chemical industry –
another high-technology sector.
Figure 17  Source: Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, Finland.37
The rapid rise of metals and engineering can be seen more clearly in Figure 18.
The vast majority of the industry’s increase has occurred since 1991, but this
growth is not expected to be sustainable – demand is expected to decline as
markets mature, and output capacity within Finland is expected to reach its
limits in the next couple of years, with further expansion likely to happen
overseas. A large part of this growth is due to the Nokia Corporation (see page
44).
Figure 18 Source: Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, Finland
Table 8 shows export data for Finland’s recent past (covering the recovery
period). The metal and engineering sector – specifically the sector in which
value is added to basic metals – now forms the majority share of Finnish
exports, with the traditional mainstay, forestry, now second. This reflects
Finland’s successful diversification away from resource-based exports into high-
technology, value-added exports.38
Table 8   Source: Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, Finland
Finland as a Gateway
Although Finland lost a large share of its trade with the Soviet Union in 1990, it
has begun to rebuild trade with its eastern neighbours, particularly through
productive links with Estonia. The Estonian and Finnish languages are
members of the Uralic family and this has helped diminish communication
barriers.
Finland’s relationship with Estonia allows Finnish firms access to a reasonably
skilled workforce with low labour costs. As a result, some firms have been
locating production facilities in Estonia, which has a beneficial spill-over for
Estonia in building skill capability and drawing Estonia into the international
market economy.
Another aspect of the gateway trade is re-exports. Finland now exports tropical
fruit to Russia; a reflection of its experience in trading with other market
economies, which means it has been able to adapt quickly to meet Russian
demand for a variety of goods.  Finnish firms hope to consolidate their gateway
role as Russia develops over the next decades.
Current Account
Finland currently runs a current account surplus of around 5% per annum. The
accrual of surpluses has been helped by falls in import prices and by the
Finnish enthusiasm for investing overseas.  Direct investment in foreign
companies has risen dramatically since the recession and is currently around
22 billion Markka (NZ$6.7 billion). Foreign investment in Finnish firms has also
risen in the last decade, and is now around 8 billion Markka (NZ$2.4 billion).39
Figure 19   Source: Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, Finland.
Sectoral Breakdown
Output
Table 9 shows the decline in primary production in Finland since the war, a
phenomenon which has occurred to greater or lesser extents throughout the
industrialised world. A similarly ubiquitous phenomenon can be seen in the
growth of service industries, which increased from 34% to 60% of economic
output in Finland between 1950 and 1995. Industry and construction have
remained reasonably constant throughout the post-war period after an
immediate post-war expansion (owing to reparations and repairs to the Finnish
infrastructure).
Main Components of Total Output, Finland
1950 1960 1970 1980 1995
Primary production 26 18 12 10 4.6
Industry and construction 40 38 40 39 35.6
Services 34 44 48 51 59.8
Total 100 100 100 100 10040
Table 9 Source: National Accounts, Statistics Finland
New Zealand’s experience has been different. In the years between the end of
the Second World War and Britain’s entry into the European Community in
1973, New Zealand had a large, guaranteed market for its produce. This meant
that New Zealand continued to rely heavily on its primary produce, as it had
done for most of its history.
Only since the 1970s has New Zealand faced pressures to diversify its produce
and seek new markets. There is some suggestion that the economic policies
pursued in the 1970s and early 1980s retarded the development of diverse,
internationally competitive industries, and it has only been in the last 15 years
that New Zealand has begun to really compete in non-agricultural global
markets.
Adjustment in the wake of Britain’s accession to the European Community is
often given as a reason for New Zealand’s sluggish performance over the last
15 years – it takes time to learn the new skills and management techniques
appropriate to international free trade.
Main Components of Total Output, New Zealand
1952 1960 1970 1980 1995
Primary production 22.5 20.7 15.5 10.7
Industry and construction 31.8 34.8 32.0 32.2
Services 45.7 44.5 52.5 57.1
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Table 10   Source: New Zealand Yearbooks
To some extent the different experiences of Finland and New Zealand have
meant they have embarked on different trajectories.  While Finland was pushed
into industry and manufacturing by its post-war situation, New Zealand was
encouraged into further reliance on commodity production.
These different forces have driven the economies in slightly different directions,
although these differences are perhaps masked by the broad classification of
economic “sectors”; much of Finland’s recent growth has been in the high-
technology service sector – particularly in telecommunications and electronics –
while these sectors have not (yet) grown as vigorously in New Zealand.41
Figure 20   Source: Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, Finland.42
Table 11 Source: Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, Finland.
In terms of the value added by different kinds of economic activity (see Table
12), the best value-added growth over the decade 1987-97 was in
communications and manufacturing. The largest contraction was in
construction, which, as noted before, was hit very hard by the recession.
Industry
Figure 21 shows the spectacular growth in the metals and engineering sectors
in Finland during the 1990s.  While manufacturing as a whole has increased by43
around 80%, the metals and engineering sector has grown by about twice this
amount.
Figure 21 Source: Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, Finland.
Much of this growth has been due to the burgeoning telecommunications
industry and the Nokia Corporation, which has net sales (1998) of around US$8
billion. Nokia has averaged growth of around 25% per annum since 1994 and
possesses around 20% of the international mobile phone industry (the other big
players being Ericsson and Motorola).
The forestry sector has also posted strong growth of around 60% over the same
period, while growth in the chemical industry has been more modest at around
20%.44
Nokia Corporation
Nokia Corporation has contributed significantly to Finland’s successful recovery.
Nokia was founded in 1865 as a forestry enterprise in south-west Finland,
obtaining its name from the river on which its sawmill was based. In 1966 the
company merged with Finnish Rubber Works and Finnish Cable Works to form
the Nokia Corporation. It was initially a diversified conglomerate, involved in
paper, rubber, chemicals and cables, entering the telephone industry in the
1960s.
The groundwork for telecommunications was laid in the 1960s, when Nokia
researched the field of radio transmission in its electronics department. In the
late 1970s, mobile phones and telecommunications infrastructure products were
developed for both domestic and international customers. Nokia really began to
focus on telecommunications as its core business in the 1980s, and this has
borne fruit this decade when it has become one of the world’s leading mobile
telecommunications companies.
Since 1992, Nokia has divested most of its non-core operations and has
concentrated on telecommunications and mobile phones. It has become a
global leader in supplying systems for mobile and fixed networks, which
accounts for around 30% of its turnover.  Another 30% of turnover comes from
multimedia, interactive satellite and cable terminals and PC and workstation
monitors, as well as accessories and components for mobile phones.
The other 40% of Nokia’s turnover comes from Nokia Mobile Phones, which is
currently the second largest manufacturer of mobile phones in the world (and
the largest in Europe).
Partly because of the seeding by its development units in the 1970s and 1980s,
Nokia is now a technological front-runner in cell-phone technology.  For
example, the company was the first to introduce cell-phones compatible with all
digital standards.  Over a quarter of its 32,000 employees are actively involved
in research.
The diversification from rubber and cable company to telecommunications giant
had several aspects.  Even before the 1960s the Finnish Cable Company had
been involved in making cables for the Finnish telegraph and telephone
network. In 1960 the company set up an electronics department to take
advantage of emerging technology in electronics. This was a good time to be
involved because the dispersion of semiconductor technology meant that most
players faced similar learning curves with the new technology.45
The then president of the company, Bj|rn Westerlund, made sure it had good
relationships with universities and colleges and was enthusiastic about hiring
scientists and inventors, while the head of the electronics department had a
clear idea of how to turn the ambitious blueprints into goods that would work in
the marketplace.
In 1967 Nokia adopted the pulse code modulation (PCM) system, which was
the latest available technology in telecommunications. Nokia Corporation
attributes much of its recent success to the strategic decision to enter the digital
age early. Work on wireline and microwave transmission and mobile radio
technology – which had export markets in Scandinavia and the Soviet Union–
continued throughout the 1970s.
There are about half a dozen aspects in the liberalisation of telecommunication
markets which are believed to have been significant in the success of Nordic
telecommunications firms:
·  The erosion of the monopoly power of telecommunication companies
through the establishment of new operators.
·  The complete liberalisation of the market for subscriber equipment.
·  The harmonisation of technical standards to reduce non-tariff barriers to
trade.
·  The opening of national markets through the legal requirement to
internationally tender all public procurement above certain amounts.
·  Changes in corporate culture through increased competition.
·  Increased separation of service provision and service regulation.
All six are consistent with current New Zealand policy, although it is likely that
the third would not receive the attention in New Zealand that it has in Finland,
where there is a considerable emphasis on harmonisation.
From the Nokia website:
“One of the reasons for Nokia's strength in telecommunications is that Finland,
unlike many other countries, has always encouraged competition in the
industry. In the 1960s and 70s most European operators still purchased their
switches from national suppliers and the expensive research needed was in the
hands of just a few companies. In the Finnish market a unique competitive
situation reigned. Since the country's first telephone connections were
established in the 1880s there have been several operators in Finland. Neither
they nor the Finnish PTT (Post, Telephone and Telegraph Administration)
automatically bought their equipment from national suppliers. Since entering the
telecom markets, tough international competition and demanding customers
have helped Nokia constantly develop its businesses and products.“46
Table 12 presents Finnish industrial production on a finer scale.  The first and
last columns are probably the most interesting aspects for current purposes –
the 1997 shares of production and the 1997-87 ratios of production.
It can be seen that the fastest growing sector of industry – by far – has been
electronics and electric products. Output in 1998 grew by 22% overall, while
output in telecommunications grew by a staggering 45%. Growth in demand has
been good globally, but capacity limits and shortages of skilled labour – despite
Finland’s world-leading production of scientists and engineers – looks set to
impose limits on the growth of these sectors within Finland.
Generally, growth has been stronger in the high value-added sectors than in the
commodity sectors. The basic metals sector has seen good growth, but the
Finns are not optimistic about this sector in the long run as profitability is
expected to fall with sinking prices over time.
Table 12 Source: Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, Finland.47
In spite of modest recent growth in the chemical industry, the Finns seem
optimistic that this has been due to turbulence in the oil industry and that the
chemical industry should be able to flourish in the long run.
Growth has been negative in most of the “other” categories, except food, which
has been aided during the recovery by the “gateways” opening up to the East.
In particular the clothing and textile sector has been hit hard over the last
decade, especially since the collapse of trade with the Soviet Union (which was
the destination for much Finnish clothing).
Services
The movement away from the primary sector into the service sector has been a
common phenomenon throughout the industrial world since the end of the
Second World War. Finland shares this trend with most countries, including
New Zealand (see Tables 9 and 10).
However, Finland’s recent past (Figure 22, Table 13) masks Finland’s success
in services because the 1990s’ recession shows so strongly in that sector.
Figure 22 shows all the plotted sectors sinking in terms of their output between
1990 and the mid-1990s.
Some of these sectors have taken longer than others to recover – generally the
high-tech, high value-added end of the service spectrum has bounced back
more quickly than the low-technology sectors, and this is reflected in the column
at the far right of Table 13, which shows that many service sectors had not
recovered to their 1980s’ boom level even by 1997. However, as Finland
shakes off the last of the effects of the recession, the service sector is expected
to grow by around 10% in the next year or two.48
Table 13 Source: Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, Finland.
Value added in private services increased by 20% between 1994 and 1998,
although some areas – such as commerce and financial intermediation –
continue to drag the chain. Much of the slowness in some sectors is due to the
gradual recovery of domestic demand for these services in the post-recession
years.
Transport and communication services have grown faster than any other
service sector, reflecting the blossoming of Finnish telecommunications. This
trend is expected to continue into the future as telecommunications strengthens.
Computer services, business services, construction technology, advertising and
security services are also growing robustly towards the end of the decade.49
Figure 22 Source: Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, Finland.50
Industrial Structure
Finnish authorities express some concern that their history and culture have not
supported entrepreneurship. This is because the large-scale industrialisation
that has taken place over the past 50 years has often been associated with
large, often government, firms.  A culture of “going out on your own” does not
seem to have developed to the level the Finns would have liked.
Table 14 shows Finland’s industrial structure in firm size and employment. New
Zealand has more firms at all sizes than Finland does. The fourth column
presents the ratio (in percentage form) of the number of New Zealand firms at
each size to the number of Finnish firms at each size. The final column then
weights these ratios by the average ratio of New Zealand firms to Finnish firms
to see – relatively – the differences in composition between the sizes of firms in
each country.






0-10 190,931 224,720 117.7% 100.0%
10-49 10,128 15,955 157.5% 133.8%
50-99 1082 1429 132.1% 112.2%
100+ 1217 1276 104.8% 89.1%
Totals 203,358 243,380 117.7% 100.0%
Table 14   Sources: Statistics Finland, Statistics New Zealand.
Compared with New Zealand, at least, the Finnish authorities do appear to have
a point: New Zealand has more than half as many firms in the 10-49 employee
range as Finland. Even when we consider that New Zealand simply has more
firms than Finland, we can see there are proportionally a third more firms of this
size within the New Zealand economy than there are in Finland.
Only at the largest scales in terms of firm size do we see anything like
aggregate parity, and this implies that there are proportionally fewer large New
Zealand firms than large Finnish firms. And the largest of Finnish firms are quite
large – Nokia employs 32,000 people (worldwide), while New Zealand’s largest
private sector employer is Telecom, with about 9000 staff.
Finland is particularly anxious about the number of small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) – that there are not enough of them and that costs are very
high for small businesses (in compliance and in employers’ social security
contributions
20). This situation probably arose out of Finland’s post-war industrial
structure, where large firms and a large public sector dominated employment,
and unions – representing the interests of workers – sat across the table in
negotiations.
                                           
20 Both unemployment and social security are partially funded by employers.51
The result seems to have been that SMEs were for some time left out of the
policy loop, and only in the recent past have Finnish authorities been seeking to
make it easier for these firms to do business.
Another part of the reason for renewed focus on SMEs is that this is where a
good portion of Finland’s growth has been occurring, even during the recession.
Encouraging entrepreneurship is one of the main planks of industrial policy,
along with the development of Finland as an information society.
The next section discusses growth owing to new, technology-based firms in
Finland, with particular focus on growth among these firms before and during
the recession, which is also before and up to the start of the Nokia boom. It is
therefore likely that many of these high-tech firms were being started and
beginning to prosper independent of Nokia.
New, Technology-based Firms
New, technology-based firms (NTBFs) have been a prime force behind
Finland’s growth over the last dozen or so years.
High-technology firms have had higher creation and destruction rates than
others and this sector responded differently to the recession from other sectors
by experiencing higher volatility (perhaps reflecting a different risk profile of
high-tech enterprises).
21 The high-tech industry also accounted for higher
proportional job growth (relative to its share of the economy) than other sectors,
while the low-technology sectors contributed proportionally more in job
destruction.
Several different explanations have been offered for the economic contributions
from NTBFs:
·  Schumpeterian – NTBFs are the agents of “creative destruction” destroying
old firms and replacing them with more efficient high-tech enterprises.
·  Flexible specialisation – NTBFs allow more flexible specialisation than would
be available under other institutional arrangements.
·  Innovation system – NTBFs fulfil the role of innovation assets, possibly
arising from the process of vertical disintegration of research and
development enterprises.
·  Industrial organisation – NTBFs develop as the balance between internal
and external co-ordination costs changes.
During the recession of the early 1990s NTBFs continued to proliferate in
Finland. This is consistent with several of the explanations of the effects of
NTBFs – the presence of unemployment among innovative punters provides a
somewhat desperate incentive to create their own entrepreneurial enterprises.
                                           
21 See, for example, Vainiomaki and Laaksonen (1999).52
The rapid growth in high-technology sectors in Finland in 1986-93 “indicates a
sharp increase in the relative importance of high-technology sectors during the
economic recession”
22. The number of firms in high-technology sectors
increased by 42% between 1986 and 1993, despite the fact that the total
number of industrial firms declined by 9% over the same period.
Looking at the Finnish economy as a whole, NTBFs increased from 19% to 27%
across all industries over the same period.
Increases in the high-tech sectors were most common in very large firms (firms
employing over 1000 people increased by 57%) and very small firms (firms
employing four or fewer). This is consistent with explanations of the effects of
NTBFs which emphasise the importance of networking.
There was less growth over the period in medium-sized NTBFs. One
explanation for this is that once firms reach around 10 employees the next
phase of growth eats capital, partly because small firms often have difficulties
accessing distribution channels.
There was rapid growth among the smallest firms during the recession, and this
is consistent with the recession-push explanation, as is the increasing rate of
unemployment among university-trained engineers during this period.
During the recession the highest growth occurred in high-technology services,
among the smallest-sized firms. Strong growth was also recorded among small
firms in some of the high-tech hardware sectors (instruments, fine-mechanical
apparatus, etc) and much of this is believed to have resulted from the effects of
clustering, particularly in the telecommunications industry where the success of
the Nokia Corporation has helped small firms grow.
The strong growth in high-technology sectors was (obviously) not sufficient to
completely ameliorate the effects of recession in other parts of the economy.
During the recession the share of people employed in high-technology sectors
increased from 13% to 17% of the total workforce, but such relative changes
must be viewed with some caution because of the large contraction in
employment over this period.
On another hand, other evidence supports the flexible specialisation
explanation.  Many of the more successful SMEs on the Helsinki Stock
Exchange are subcontractors to the Nokia Corporation, and it seems their
success is not entirely independent of that fact.
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Technology-Based Firms During a Recessionary Period: The Case of Finland, Small Business
Economics, 11: 113-123, 1998.53
High-technology Firms in Small Countries
Michael Porter’s The Competitive Advantage of Nations emphasised the
important role played by firms clustering with other relevant firms to produce
positive externalities in the production process. On this view, competitiveness
can be generated via the numerous interactions and networks that firms can
share with other firms working in similar industries, or at least towards similar
goals.
According to Porter, national competitiveness is generated by the number and
size of internationally competitive firms in a given country, and ultimately this is
a function of the capacity of an industry to innovate and upgrade. If a country
can create internationally competitive industries, it can potentially bring greater
growth to the national economy.
The agglomeration or clustering of similar or related industrial activities is an
important part of most accounts of clustering. This co-location of firms can occur
on a variety of scales: a few city blocks, a province or region, or even across an
entire small country.
Clustering does seem to be a common phenomenon, and there might be
various reasons why this is the case.
Marshall (1890) proposed the following reasons why clustering might be
important in some industries’ success:
·  It provides a pooled market for workers with specialised skills.
·  It facilitates the development of specialised inputs and services.
·  It enables firms to benefit from spill-overs
Because technological progress, technological spill-overs and human capital
are important to this process, and because they are under-provided by the
market
23, there is potentially a place for government action in enhancing human
capital and correcting for private sector under-investment.
Finland does this by risk-sharing between government agencies such as the
National Technology Development Centre (TEKES) and the Academy of
Finland, and the Finns seem enthusiastic about the results. The idea that
Finland can become an “information society” seems to have some real faith
behind it. Finland also seeks to encourage people into certain areas of
education – engineering and the natural sciences, and business and
commercial skills.
The growth of Nokia and the high-tech telecommunications sector has
encouraged many people to believe that Finland should concentrate on high-
tech, high value-added products, consistent with Porter’s emphasis on
technological progress and the ability to innovate. The increasing fraction of
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GDP devoted to R&D in Finland provides some evidence that it is committed to
the information society in a concrete way.
It is important to note that this R&D is not necessarily in high-tech sectors –
Finland is relatively specialised in the low- or medium-tech sectors, and this is
where much research activity happens. For example, the Finnish forestry
industry spends approximately 3% of value added on R&D, while the Swedish
and Canadian forestry industries spend 2.5% and 1% respectively
24.
It has been suggested (by Maskell et al, for instance) that small countries lack
competitive advantage in research-intensive activities, and will struggle to
maintain high-tech industries in the long run. On this view:
·  high-technology is high risk. Old technological leaders tend to get new
competitors under control by massive R&D investments, economies of
scale and acquisitions
·  leading technology is expensive and normally exceeds the financial
resources available to small companies and small countries
·  scarcity in the availability of capital and labour in small countries can
seriously constrain development. Finland has been experiencing this
recently with shortages of scientists and commercially trained people,
although this may potentially be a smaller problem in countries that speak
more widely-spoken languages
·  spill-overs are not always contained within the country investing in R&D.
Technological spill-overs are likely to pour across borders as windfall gains
for countries that have not made the initial investment
·  small domestic markets can fail to make intensive R&D investment
worthwhile.
·  small countries lack the sorts of R&D facilities that large countries enjoy,
which inevitably leads to specialisation.  In Finland this has been in
forestry and telecommunications; in New Zealand, grass products.
Maskell et al offer quite a lot of evidence for their position, but there are enough
counterexamples,
 both in the region
25 and in other small countries, to think that
this might be a general rule rather than an inviolable law.
They discuss the paths by which Nokia and Ericsson came to their current
positions of strength, and offer somewhat melancholy conclusions: that large-
country firms such as Motorola and AT&T might move into the small-country
firms’ markets to the detriment of the Scandinavian firms.
When considering their discussion of the idiosyncratic path of the Scandinavian
cell-phone manufacturers, it is worthwhile remembering that similarly
idiosyncratic stories of good fortune and path dependence can be told about
any successful firm, regardless of the country of origin. However, there is
                                           
24 Hernesniemi et al, 1996.
25 Volvo, Husqvarna, Saab, Ericsson, Nokia, for instance, are all high-technology firms from
Scandinavia.55
probably good reason to suspect that the conclusions are reasonable enough –
that small countries’ competitive advantage in innovation is in highly
specialised, niche products where technological innovation is on the process
rather than product side.
The comparison certainly provides compelling evidence that an appropriate mix
of location, available resources, human capital and policy settings is crucially
important – and that adopting Finnish policy without careful thought about the
other pre-conditions of success is unlikely to achieve such impressive results. In
fact, one of the most striking characteristics of Finnish public policy is the very
careful thought given to how it can help different industries and sectors, such as
in its agricultural policy (see page 85).
Social Capital in Finland
The social capital explanation is another commonly advanced for the success of
some high-tech firms (on which Maskell et al touch but which has been
discussed further in Perry (1998), and even Scientific American).
According to this view, firms prosper when there is a high level of trust and
information-sharing across firms within industries. Silicon Valley is the most
commonly cited example – it is said there is a culture of idea-sharing that
enables the firms to perform more highly than would otherwise be the case.
Various arguments have been advanced for why small countries may be more
likely to generate and sustain higher levels of social capital.  These include:
·  co-ordination issues – co-ordination is considerably easier in smaller
countries, and this may be a reason why centralised wage setting has
lasted better in small countries
·  homogeneity – shared senses of identity contribute to trust, as does
shared experience. If the members of a community are experiencing the
same events as their neighbours, bonds are more likely to develop
between them.
Most measurements of social capital place the Nordic countries at the very top
of international comparisons. It may be that homogeneity, egalitarianism or
some other cultural phenomenon drives this in Scandinavia more than in other
small countries like New Zealand.
One thing Nordic governments seem particularly adept at is managing to bring
the whole country with them when they change; generally the political process
in Scandinavia is more consensus-based and less adversarial than it is in New
Zealand. If trust is the goal, it seems reasonable that consensus-based policy-
making has some advantage over the adversarial processes often employed in
New Zealand.56
In addition, the Nordic countries generally do very well on internationally
standardised literacy and numeracy tests, and there is probably a link between
a country’s social capital and its educational performance.
Perhaps another salient feature in Finland’s cultural milieu is newspaper
circulation. Finland has the third highest newspaper circulation per capita in the
world
26 behind Norway and Japan, two countries often cited as exemplars of
social capital. If nothing else, this reflects the high level of Finnish literacy and
suggests they take an interest in their community. These two features alone go
some way to suggesting that the Finns enjoy a reasonably healthy democracy
27.
New Zealand starts on the diversification path later than Finland
As pointed out by Brian Easton in In Stormy Seas, New Zealand started the
post-war period with an economy similar to that of Argentina or Uruguay, but
closes the century with an economy more like that of Finland, although nowhere
near as technically oriented.
Both New Zealand and Finland have diversified their exports since the war, and
New Zealand’s story may be more dramatic in this regard. Easton’s point about
New Zealand’s post-war similarity to Argentina has an ominous echo in Jane
Jacobs’ comparison between Uruguay and New Zealand in Cities and the
Wealth of Nations, where she discusses these countries in the context of
“supply regions”. These are regions – “economic grotesques”, Jacobs calls
them – that are removed from the cities they supply and that specialise in very
few, usually primary sector, products.
“Today Uruguay has what is called a Third World economy, but even when
it was prospering, Uruguay had a Third World economy insofar as that
term conveys backwardness, lack of development.  Uruguay had merely
been rich, and the difference between a rich backward economy and a
poor backward economy is not all that great.  Rich or poor, supply regions
are inherently over-specialized and wildly unbalanced economies, hence
unresilient and fragile, helpless when they lose their fragments of distant
markets….”
28
Although New Zealand’s performance over the last couple of decades has been
less than stellar, it has not been as catastrophic as Jacobs suggests it might
otherwise have been. New Zealand’s forays into import substitution were
arrested before they could wreak the sort of damage they wrought in Uruguay.
In many senses, if we are looking for “counterfactual” countries for New
Zealand, we would be better to look at countries from which we have diverged
                                           
26 Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile 1999-2000.
27 See, for example, the interesting discussion on necessary pre-conditions for democracy in
Machiavelli’s Discourses.
28 Jane Jacobs, Cities and the Wealth of Nations: principles of economic life, 1984, Random
House, p6357
rather than those (like Ireland and Finland) which we have become like
(because the causality flows the wrong way in these cases).
On this view, the urbanisation and diversification which have played such a part
in New Zealand’s recent story may well be the most important economic events
of the last two or three decades. Finland (and most industrialised countries)
have experienced similar trends, but because New Zealand’s post-war
economic base was so narrow, these factors may have been relatively more
significant in New Zealand’s case than in countries like Finland, where there
was always more than forestry.
GOVERNMENT POLICY
Monetary Policy
The Finnish Markka was managed within a narrow band against a basket of
currencies for most of the 1980s (October 1982 to March 1989). This was done
to provide a solid anchor against inflation expectations and to keep Finnish
goods reasonably neutral in terms of cost-competitiveness with those of other
countries.
The inflation objective was largely successful from 1982 to 1987, but then
domestic overheating in the wake of financial deregulation led to an increase in
the differential between Finnish inflation and inflation in the countries against
which the Markka was fixed.
In 1988 the Bank of Finland found that maintaining a short-term interest
differential of between 1.5% and 2% between the Markka and the basket of
currencies implied that the Markka was nearly always at the top of the band in
terms of the exchange rate. In response to mounting pressure on the Markka,
the fluctuation band was widened from 4.5% to 6% in November 1988.
However, this did not alleviate the situation much at all – by January 1989 the
exchange rate was again close to the upper limit of the band as capital inflows
during 1987 and 1988 strongly boosted domestic liquidity and bank lending. The
Bank of Finland mopped up liquidity by raising the cash reserve requirement of
banks several times during the period of rising pressure, but ultimately these
techniques proved ineffective.
In early 1989 overheating affected wage agreements – the agreements after
August 1988 were much higher than the incomes policy had expected, while
continuing terms-of-trade gains increased demand and weakened employers’
resistance to wage demands.
In March 1989 Finland moved the fluctuation band by 4%, and allowed the
Markka to appreciate by around 3%. This reduced international competitiveness
and the profitability of Finland’s export industries. Exports fell sharply in
response, particularly in the forestry sector. Later in 1989 speculative pressure
on the Markka began to build, and this increased domestic interest rates.58
Although there was a fall in interest rates in January 1990, it was only a brief
respite – further speculative pressures increased interest rates again in the final
quarter of 1990, which raised the real costs of finance in the wake of falling
inflation.
Figure 23  Source: OECD.
The first clear signs of a recession began with a decline in domestic demand
around the start of 1990, when household consumption started to decelerate.
This was followed by dramatic declines in household and business investment
some time later; seasonally adjusted private sector investment shrank by 27%
in the second quarter of 1990. The nascent Finnish recession was then
exacerbated by the collapse of the Soviet Union, in particular the collapse of
bilateral trade agreements.
As the recession deepened it became increasingly difficult for Finland to
maintain appropriately loose monetary conditions to help it weather the
recession, and appropriately tight monetary conditions to resist speculative
attacks. Given Finland’s track record in devaluation (it had been a frequent








































































exchange-rate tinkerer until the early 1980s) Finnish authorities found it difficult
to convince the markets of their commitment to the status quo. This lack of
confidence generated high risk premiums in Finnish interest rates.
Eventually, Finland was forced to devalue the Markka by around 12% in
November 1991. This improved the international competitiveness of Finnish
goods but largely failed to address credibility concerns. Monetary policy was still
constrained by exchange rate considerations, and renewed downward pressure
on the Markka eventually led to the decision to float the Markka in September
1992.
The Markka immediately devalued by around 8%, but the combination of the
float, fiscal consolidation package and restrained wage-setting round eased
short-term interest rates. However, interests rates remained higher than their
historical average in response to the costs of servicing the credit that Finns
racked up during the late 1980s.
In February 1993 the Bank of Finland announced a specific inflation target
which was designed to serve as a guideline for monetary policy – this basically
aimed at stabilising inflation – although it was accepted at the time that volatility
in the exchange rate would mean that the target band would be breached from
time to time.
The exchange rate has remained low throughout most of the export-led
recovery.  While the Markka has appreciated since its 1993 level, it has not
risen to more than 90% of its real 1990 value. The appreciation between 1993
and 1995 was basically driven by the shift in the net trade position (see Figure
14): a “permanent” wedge between exports and imports seems to have opened
up since the recession, with Finland moving from a near-zero net trade position
to a positive equilibrium position. The fact that exports are no longer
accelerating away from imports has alleviated upward pressures on the Markka.
On 1 January 1999 Finland entered into monetary union with several other
European countries. Monetary conditions had been relatively loose as Finland
recovered from its deep slump. By the start of 1998 it appeared that Finland had
largely completed its recovery process and was looking to tighten monetary
policy somewhat. There have been concerns that the Finns have inherited
looser monetary conditions (mainly from France) than are appropriate given the
advanced stage of the recovery. Finnish authorities have indicated they will
tighten local domestic conditions via fiscal thriftiness.
The exchange rate series for the two countries reveals substantial differences,
especially in the period to the mid-1980s, when New Zealand floated its
currency. Since then the Markka and dollar have varied by similar amounts, with
both countries being beset by large real devaluations in the 1990s (Finland in
1990 and New Zealand in the wake of the Asian crisis). The low (by 1970s and
1980s standards) value of the Markka aided an export-led recovery from the
deep slump of the early 1990s.60
Interest Rates
Both long- and short-term interest rates rose during Finland’s slump. Long-term
rates rose from around 10% in 1988 to about 14% in 1990, then stayed high for
around three years before falling to around 6% in 1993. They rose in 1994 to
about 8% but have steadily decreased since to about 4%.
Short term interest rates showed more variability (around a slightly higher
mean) in the early years of the slump, mirrored the decline of long-term rates in
1993, but remained lower than long-term rates through the mid-1990s.
Figure 24  Source: OECD.











Figure 25 Source: OECD.














The CPI inflation rate (percentage change in consumer prices) for both Finland
and New Zealand was generally high for a decade from 1973. While inflation
declined in Finland in the mid-1980s, this was a time of high inflation in New



















































Figure 26   Source: OECD.63
Fiscal Policy
The public sector of Finland’s economy has – predictably – grown significantly
in the last decade: in 1988 it was a mere
29 40.5%. A decade later, following the
recession, the tax burden had risen to 47% of GDP, while government
expenditure was at 54% of GDP.
The generous welfare entitlements which the Finns share in common with their
Nordic neighbours have magnified the costs of the recession – when
unemployment increased more than five-fold between 1989 and 1993, welfare
costs increased considerably.
Finland did not reduce transfers during the recession, nor did it raise tax rates to
cover the full costs of welfare.  It treated the welfare costs incurred as largely
temporary and was prepared to fund them through borrowing (see Figure 27).
Finnish debt increased from less than 20% of GDP in the late 1980s to nearly
70% by 1996.
The central government financial balance has recently moved from deficit to a
small surplus of ½% of GDP in 1998. The central government is using asset
sales to retire debt. Central government debt as a fraction of GDP is projected
to fall to around 60% by the end of 1999, a 13% reduction on the maximum debt
of 68.9% in 1996.
Finland has recently embarked on dealing with some of the less desirable
incentives which (may) arise from a generous welfare state.  In early 1997 the
Government began to reform some welfare programmes, tightening the rules
around benefit eligibility
30 and reducing the generosity of some benefits.
Since the crisis in the early 1990s (rises in transfers and decreases in output
affect both the numerator and denominator in tax/GDP), fiscal consolidation has
become an increasingly important priority.  Austerity packages have been
introduced during the last two administrations, and savings of about 6% and 4%
(respectively) of GDP have been attained.
These packages have targeted a variety of areas:
·  Reductions in central government transfers to municipalities.
·  Social transfers to households.
·  Central government consumption and subsidies.
                                           
29 By Nordic standards.
30 In the areas of unemployment, early retirement and various labour market programmes. They
have also moved to ensure medical authenticity in the areas of sickness and invalid benefits.64
Figure 27  Source: Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, Finland.
These austerity measures have mitigated the effects on expenditure, and the
consensus seems to be that they have largely met their objectives –
government expenditure peaked in 1993 at just over 60% of GDP and has since
fallen to 54%.
The initially low level of indebtedness probably helped Finland weather the
crisis better than it would have otherwise – blowing out from 20% to 70%
involves lower servicing costs than blowing out from 60% to 110%.
Because the Finnish economy is currently in a phase when the brakes need to
be applied, and because the Finns have effectively lost monetary policy as a
tool for controlling their economy, the task of arresting the voracity of excess
demand falls to further fiscal prudence.
In order to do this, and to reduce government debt levels, the Government has
introduced further spending cuts in the last year or so (although these only
amount to around 0.5% of GDP). This has been accompanied by small tax cuts
(to payroll tax).65
Composition of Government Expenditure
Table 15 shows Finnish and New Zealand government expenditure according to
sector.
The most immediately evident feature is the huge difference between the
welfare components between the two countries.  In Finland, as in New Zealand,
superannuation accounts for much of this, but unemployment figures strongly in
the Finnish picture – approximately 5% of GDP in 1996. This share has





Social security and welfare 22.6 13.0
Other 17.1 10.8




Total as percent of GDP 55.9 34.9
Table 15  Sources: Statistics Finland, New Zealand Treasury.
New Zealand spends about 20% more on health than Finland, but about 9%
less on education. However, given Finnish enthusiasm for science and
engineering this should not be surprising as these endeavours are costly.
Amongst the “Other” category are expenditures such as core government
services, law and order, defence, transport and communication, financing costs
(more severe for Finland than New Zealand) and the purchase of other goods
and services by the Government.
Superannuation
Finland has recently revamped its superannuation system, largely because of
concerns about the sustainability of the previous system in the face of
population ageing. This problem has been exacerbated by the lowering of
retirement age over time and the erosion of the tax base during the recent
crisis.   Reform has included introducing a means test for the flat rate pension.
The Finnish superannuation system has two tiers:
1.  National Flat Rate Pension Scheme – provides a basic income to all people
aged over 65 (this accounts for around 4.5% of GDP). The rate is not flat,
but falls with increasing income from the occupational scheme.66
2.  Occupational Scheme – all working Finns contribute a percentage of their
income to “pay-as-you-go” pension plans, which are usually run by private
pension institutions and normally provide more income than the national
scheme.  The expenditure on occupational pensions at 9.6% of GDP is more
than twice the expenditure on the national scheme.  While managed by
private institutions, defined benefits are not fully financed.  These
contributions are essentially a tied tax, which is supplemented by general
revenue sources to pay any deficit
31.
The two schemes between them account for 11.6% of GDP, substantially
exceeding both New Zealand’s expenditure (around 6%) and the OECD
average of around 7.5%. Only Sweden and Italy spend more on their older
citizens.
Finland’s population is ageing more rapidly than those in most other OECD
countries and this places increasing pressure on public pension financing.  The
ratio of elderly people as a percent of the working age population will increase
from 21.5% in the year 2000 to 24.3% in 2010, 34.7% in 2020 and 41.1% in
2030.  The comparable ratios for New Zealand are 17.1%, 18.9%, 24.6% and
30.5%.
Summary
Finland already spends considerably more than the OECD average on its older
citizens and has been looking to reform its own system.  The ageing of its
population means that the fiscal burden of pension financing will rise
dramatically in the first few decades of the next century.
Other Welfare Costs
Despite the cost blow-outs of the early 1990s, Finland is continuing to pursue
the Nordic system of welfare – universality, gender equality and a reasonable
benefit level. However, as the fiscal costs of welfare have ballooned as
unemployment has risen, tensions have increased between the employed and
unemployed, with some claiming that there is a cultural change taking place
(the beginnings of an “unemployment culture”).
Health
Public provision is the dominant form of financing both general and specialised
health care in Finland, with the public sector fulfilling the role of both purchaser
and provider. Budget reform in 1993 has meant that the system has basically
been run at municipal level over recent years. Municipal authorities enjoy
almost full discretion on the scope, content and organisation of health services.
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across OECD Countries, Social Policy Division, OECD, p12.67
Central government transfers lump sum funding to municipal health authorities,
which add it to their own funding.  The health authorities then spend this as they
see fit.
Primary health care is provided by municipal health centres, which provide a
wide array of services including general care, health counselling, maternity,
infant and school health care, ambulance transport and dental care. In 1998
there were around 250 of these centres in Finland.
Physicians in Finland are allowed to create their own private practices but
generally these services are provided on a part-time basis by physicians who
hold full-time posts at hospitals. A high proportion of visits to specialists are to
private practices
32. The fees for service paid to private physicians are only partly
reimbursed by the national health service, so the services tend to accumulate in
the wealthier urban areas.
Many municipalities are too small to sustain their own hospital, so many
Federations of Municipalities have been created to co-ordinate regional care. In
1998 there were 51 municipal hospitals, of which five are university hospitals,
16 are central hospitals and 30 local hospitals. Recently (1997) municipalities
have been allowed to purchase hospital care from outside their own hospital
district, and the less specialised hospital services offered by health centres also
offer some degree of competition between health providers.
The recession led to sharp reductions in central government funding. This
resulted in reduced volume output, largely through efficiency gains with –
according to the OECD – minimal loss in the scope and quality of care
provision. Health care currently accounts for roughly 7.5% of GDP in Finland, of
which about 4.5% is provided by central government and the rest is locally
funded. The aggregate expenditure is consistent with the average for OECD
countries.
The Finnish health system is generally regarded as excellent, both in terms of
facilities and health workers’ skill. As a result, the Finns enjoy good health with
reasonable life spans in spite of questionable diets. At the other end of the life
span, they have a tradition of broad-based child care and school care. They
consequently enjoy some of the lowest rates of peri-natal and infant mortality in
the OECD.
Historically the Finns have not had the most nutritious diet, but programmes
focusing on nutrition, exercise, smoking and reproductive health have made
some positive in-roads over the last 15 years. However, in spite of these
positive moves there are significant differences between the life expectancies of
older and younger generations, with circulatory diseases being among the
highest in Europe.
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Finland also has a large gap in potential lives lost between men and women,
which has several causes including cardiovascular disease and injuries.
However, the most important component of this gap is believed to be the high
incidence of suicide among young and middle-aged men.
Because municipalities control health far more than they did in the 1980s, there
are substantial variations in health care costs per capita across the 21 hospital
districts. This is not necessarily a result of to economies of scale – for example,
in the Helsinki district the costs of health care are 20% higher than the national
average. It is expected that further efficiency gains can be made.
Education
Finns spend a long time in the education system. Primary and secondary
schooling is run by municipal authorities (which also run voluntary day care and
pre-school centres). Comprehensive schooling lasts for nine years, from the
age of seven to 16, and is compulsory for all Finns. After that, pupils can (and
around 60% do) enter upper secondary schools that offer three years of broad-
based education (again run by municipal authorities).
If a pupil does not wish to continue into the upper secondary school system,
they can move into vocational education. Most schools that provide this are
small, with narrow focuses. However, the Government has recently moved to
enjoin some of the vocational schools into polytechnics; in 1991 85 vocational
schools were re-assembled to comprise 22 polytechnics. Studies in
polytechnics take three or four years – approximately the same length of time
as upper secondary school – at the end of which students leave with diplomas
that are classified as being on the same level as university degrees.
At the end of upper secondary school pupils sit matriculation examinations,
which they are required to pass before they can enter one of the 20 state-run
universities (which offer both undergraduate teaching and postgraduate
research). The Finnish university system has expanded significantly in the last
30 years and has been subject to considerable reform in the last decade.
Although Finnish education is of a very high standard, there are problems in the
system, notably at transition points.  There are concerns that many able
students find it hard to get into university in their first-choice course – it takes on
average two to three years after matriculation to find a place at university.
Because of the shortage of places, students normally apply for several courses
at once in the hope of gaining entry to a second-choice course in the likely
event that their first choice is not available. They frequently change courses as
soon as a place in their preferred course becomes available and as a result
often have several unfinished courses to their credit. This lengthens the already
long duration of study in Finland.69
Another point of strain for the system is at the top end when students attempt to
make the transition from study to work/  There are concerns that the system’s
unresponsiveness to employer demand means that it churns out too many of
some types of graduates (social sciences) and too few of others (business
graduates). There is evidence that some students from the less employable
areas extend studies even further in response to the relatively high levels of
unemployment among their colleagues.
The cost of the system is relatively high – historically very high – but the
economic crisis has led to substantial fiscal consolidation in this sector. As of
1996 students did not pay tuition fees to attend university.
Labour Market Training (LMT) is managed by the public employment service
and aims to enhance the skills of the unemployed. During the crisis the number
of people enrolled in LMT increased dramatically. The focus of LMT
programmes has been shifted in recent years towards the high-tech sectors that
are underlying much of Finland’s growth and increasing shares of its exports.
Reforms
In 1995 the Finnish authorities adopted a Development Plan for Education and
University Research, the aims of which are three-fold:
1.  Promoting vocational skills and entrepreneurship – training on small
business management and entrepreneurial skills will be included in the
vocational education sector.
2.  Improving the transition from higher education to work – basically making
universities more responsive to the demands of employers. Lecturers will be
appointed on five-year contracts and “output-based” resource allocation will
be implemented, whereby universities will be measured against various
performance indicators.
3.  Increasing training for the unemployed – in addition to increases in LMT, the
vocational training establishments will seek to increase the number of
(currently) unemployed using their services.
There is a strong correlation between education and earnings in Finland.  Male
university graduates can expect to earn 1.9 times the amount earned by those
who have only completed upper secondary school – however, there is evidence
that this ratio may be somewhat inflated at the moment because increases in
demand for the highly skilled have so far outstripped the ability of Finnish
universities to produce sufficient numbers of graduates. It is expected that the
returns to education will decline to more normal international levels as the
supply of graduates increases.
Finland, to a greater extent than most countries, exemplifies the current trend
away from traditional industries towards knowledge-based, high-tech industries
– the export share of high-tech products has quadrupled in the last two
decades. Even within the more traditional sectors such as forestry and paper
there is a shift towards product diversification and high value-added products.70
“These developments have been driven by the wealth of engineering know-how
in Finland.” (OECD Economic Survey, 1996). Science parks – intended to
create clusters or networks of engineering expertise – have also played a part in
revamping the Finnish economy.
There is concern, however, that the development of marketing, economic and
business skills has lagged behind engineering and the natural sciences.  (The
OECD regards the development of these skills as “essential”, since the demand
for commercial workers is expected to grow significantly.)  However, Finland is
concerned that it is under-investing in business subjects rather than over-
investing in technical subjects, and as part of its attempt to “Make Finland an
Information Society” has started a development programme to improve skill
levels in mathematics and the natural sciences.
Education and the Knowledge-based Economy
The Finnish education system is currently being revamped to more seamlessly
fit the enterprise and research systems. In particular, Finland is attempting to
refocus the education system so that students are more likely to be aware of
and respond to career opportunities once they leave the training system.  Part
of this refocusing has involved reducing the research resources of universities,
although funding in technical areas has remained high and the resources of the
Academy of Finland have been left virtually untouched.
The university system is well integrated into the wider research environment,
and it is through the universities that many of the state-funded projects are
carried out. Both aspects of higher education – teaching and research – are
being positioned to deal with the needs of employers.  Polytechnics are
specialising in educating people in advanced professional skills, while changes
are proposed to the structures of some university courses so that students gain
greater exposure to needed skills.
Despite some adjustments in the funding of university research, the total share
of R&D funding has increased in Finland to 2.9% of GDP. Of this amount the
Government intends a 60/40 private/public split. The Finns are attempting to
find a balance between basic and applied research, product development,
technology development and training under what might broadly be called an
innovation system. The main features they desire from this system are quality,
relevance and efficiency.
Stitching together research, education and industrial needs will obviously
require strong and responsive communication networks, and the Finns
apparently see the development of such networks and information sharing
schemes as aspects of “clustering”.
Finnish authorities are keen to embrace external players and forces in their
innovation strategy, and to this end actively seek project partners from outside71
Finland. In addition, the innovation system involves monitoring (and learning
from) research being conducted outside Finland.
European Union structural funds
33 are also used to fund the innovation system
through the establishment of science and technology parks and the
development of systematic mechanisms for ensuring a high level of innovation.
Summary
The Finnish education system suffers bottlenecks and appears slow to respond
to changes in demand from employers. However, the Finns do very well on
standardised international comparisons, so maybe there are lessons for New
Zealand in terms of the way they construct their comprehensive sector.
In the university sector, the lack of discrimination on the basis of course cost
probably helps Finland continue to produce such large numbers of technically
trained graduates. If New Zealand is serious about improving capacity in these
areas, harmonisation between education policy and industrial policy appears
important.
Recent Finnish education initiatives, designed to foster appreciation of
mathematics and the natural sciences, are new and as yet untested.  If
successful, they may provide some insight as to how Government can increase
interest in science. This may have relevance for New Zealand, where there
have been concerns about current levels of scientific literacy.
                                           
33 Not as significant for Finland as they are for Ireland.72
Labour Market
Unemployment
In the 1980s Finland enjoyed decreasing unemployment, to the point where it
was under 3% before the bubble burst in 1989.  However, the recession sent
unemployment levels soaring more than six-fold to over 18% between 1990 and
1993 (see Figure 28). Unemployment has fallen steadily since 1993 to around
10% in 1998 in response to the export-led recovery and subsequent increase in
domestic demand.
New Zealand’s experience has been more moderate, with a steady rise in
unemployment between the mid-1980s and 1990, peaking around 11% before
an equally steady fall to a mid-1990s’ low of around 6% in 1994-95.
Unemployment has risen slightly since then, partly in response to the Asian
















































Figure 28  Source: OECD.
Employment
As Figure 28 shows, employment in Finland has grown reasonably steadily over
the last five years. Sectorally, services have seen constant rises in employment,
especially in areas such as community and personal services, financing and
real estate and transport, storage and communications. Continued growth in the
service sector reflects a broader long-term trend in Finland and indeed most
industrialised economies, as does the decline in jobs in agriculture and forestry.73
The construction sector has seen strong growth over the last five years too, but
this is probably a cyclical adjustment – construction was one of the worst-hit
sectors during the recession. Jobs in the industrial sector remained roughly
constant between 1995 and 1999, reflecting the long-term consistency of
employment in this sector.
The increase in employment in the wholesale, retail and restaurant sectors
reflects a firming of domestic demand generally, while much of the growth in
personal services has been part of the story of the rapid rise of the
telecommunication and electronics industries. Significantly, it appears that job
growth in Finland has been in “young people” sectors: the unemployment rate
among those under 25 has fallen from around 30% in 1995 to around 19% now.74
Table 16  Source: Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, Finland.
Wage Setting
Wages in Finland are set by agreements between labour unions, the employers’
federation and central government. Although there have been attempts to
decentralise this process during the 1990s, the wage-setting system remains
one of the most centralised in the OECD. Although the agreements arrived at
under the system are not legally binding, they have historically specified the
lower limit of wage increases.
Contracts at industry or enterprise level – which cover up to 80% of the
workforce – are set in light of these central agreements, often using them as a
lower bound and negotiating upwards from there.
There is no legislated minimum wage in Finland, but contractual minima are set
in various industries. These minima generally keep pace with other wages in the
industry and act as a “wage floor” that contributes to the compressed wage
structure in Finland (the dispersion of earnings in Finland is considerably flatter
than that in most OECD countries). This is thought to more adversely affect the
employment prospects of low-skilled workers than other groups.
Flexibility
Finland is about average by European standards in terms of its employment
protection laws, but procedural obstacles to dismissal are higher than in most
other OECD countries. Severance pay and the criteria for dismissal are roughly
the same as those found elsewhere in Europe.
Part-time work is less common in Finland than in other countries, the result of
government attempts to enable both men and women to work full-time. In
addition, unemployed people face administrative complications if they wish to
take up part-time work. Employers, too, may contribute to the relative scarcity of
part-time work in Finland; many regard part-time work experience as being
inferior to full-time experience, and workers’ recognition of this may contribute to
the low demand for part-time work.
Tax
The Finnish system is characterised by high progressive tax rates on labour
income, and lower tax rates on capital income.  Capital tax rates in New
Zealand are reasonable comparable with the Finnish rates (although we tax
New Zealand-resident investors at a lower rate once wealth taxes are
incorporated in the analysis).  However, New Zealand income earners are taxed
at a substantially lower average rate than the Finns.  The Finnish system75
reflects a philosophy that more mobile factors of production (eg, capital) should
be taxed less heavily than labour.
Capital taxation
The Finnish tax system taxes foreign investors at a lower rate than domestic
investors. Foreigners are taxed at 28% on their capital income.  However there
is no tax on interest income earned by foreigners. There is a full dividend
imputation system, so effectively capital income is taxed only once.
This is about the level at which New Zealand taxes foreigners. We do an
imputation credit swap with foreigners that effectively reduces the tax rate below
our maximum 33% - but only just. We have an approved issuer levy for foreign
debt which taxes foreign debt, albeit at a very low rate. Unlike Finland though,
New Zealand does not charge the foreign-owned company capital gains tax on
its gains in New Zealand.
Finnish domestic investors are taxed at a higher rate than foreigners because
they are liable for high rates of inheritance and gift taxes (effectively taxes on
capital accumulation).  The details are in Appendix 2.
Assuming that property taxes and inheritance taxes are just forms of capital
taxes, the implicit rate of capital tax on domestics in Finland is high, much
higher than New Zealand.  However, the implied tax on foreigners in Finland is
about the same as New Zealand.
Capital income is taxed on a withholding basis. To distinguish labour from
capital income, the Finns presume a rate of return on capital actually employed
and everything else is labour income.  The formula allows businesses with a low
rate-of-return on equity to be taxed lower.  (Symmetrically, small business with
a high rate-of-return on equity tend to be overtaxed until they meet criteria as a
public company and hence become taxed purely as having capital income).
Income taxation
The top income tax rate in Finland is 65%, taking account of national taxes,
municipal taxes and social security payroll taxes.  Finnish residents pay flat
taxes to municipalities, with the rate varying between 15% and 20% depending
on the municipality.  A sickness insurance premium of 1.5% is a tax on earned
income.  Pension and unemployment insurance premiums are usually withheld
from employees’ salaries at a rate of 6.05%.  Table 17 gives a breakdown of the
state taxes on earned income for Finnish residents.76










312,000 and over 38.0
Table 17
Consumption tax
Value-added taxation (VAT) is applied at a high rate. The general rate is 22%
but there are a few lower rates (food, transport). VAT is economically a tax on
labour income and its introduction involves the confiscation of accrued wealth.
Summary
In summary, Finland is a high tax country that has reduced its tax on foreign
capital because it believes it is very mobile, and reduced its tax on domestic
capital, albeit to a lesser extent, given death duties and a wealth tax.  The taxes
on labour income are thus disproportionately higher.77
Industry Policy
Finland takes a more active approach to industry policy than New Zealand, but
maintains a clear focus on the goals its policy seeks.
The Ministry of Trade and Industry’s web site leads with the statement “The task
of public authorities is to formulate and implement long-term policies so as to
ensure that companies operating in Finland have the necessary business
framework to maintain and improve their international competitiveness.”
Although its central goal is to “further real entrepreneurship that is independent
of state aid” Finland believes that the Government has a real role to play in
achieving this through “making greater outlays on technology, education, and
training; raising the standard of education and training” while also “mak[ing]
sure that the regional industrial infrastructure develops in a balanced way”.
The Finns have moved away from the competition-inhibiting industrial policies
they relied on until the 1980s towards forms of industry policy that are more
consistent with competition and innovation.
This was signalled by the National Industry Strategy for Finland (1993), which
set out plans to:
·  reduce the tax burden on businesses
·  improve the quality of the markets in which they operate
·  encourage the development of SMEs
·  improve innovative potential by enhancing businesses’ technological
development.
The strategy’s goal was not to remove all industrial support but to refocus it on
reducing market failures and to promote “an efficiency driven growth strategy”.
The strategy has involved a move away from subsidising physical investment
and into subsidising intangible investment such as R&D, education, training and
the acquisition of entrepreneurial and marketing skills. To reflect this, legislation
introduced in 1998 stated that industry support schemes should be primarily
targeted on research, product development, training or on some other form of
non-corporeal corporate development, or on the long-term enhancement of
SMEs. Industry support for physical investments is now only granted on special
grounds.
Much of the industry assistance in Finland is conducted by the Technology
Development Centre of the Ministry of Trade and Industry (TEKES). In 1997,
TEKES distributed almost three billion Markka (NZ$0.9 billion) to universities,
research institutes and private companies. Financial support constitutes the
dominant support mechanism for technological innovation in Finland, usually
taking the form of grants.78
Finland has massively increased its R&D input compared to other countries,
moving from 1.5% of GDP in 1985 to 3.1% in 1999. At the same time the share
of high-tech exports from Finland has tripled.
Most of this investment – around 68% – comes from the private sector. The
Government’s target of a 60/40 private/public split in R&D funding reflects the
basic argument that if the private sector is willing to make risky investments in
R&D (which may well have positive spin-offs for the economy as a whole), the
Government should mitigate some of the risk and bear some of the cost of the
R&D.
During the 1990s the dominant
forms of support have changed
markedly. Support for regional
development fell from 81% of total
industry expenditure in 1989 to
27% in 1996. On the other hand,
support for R&D, SMEs and
export-oriented activities rose from
16% to 72% over the same period.
The support for SMEs has
basically three aspects:
1.  European Union structural
funds are estimated to have
created around 14,000 jobs
and saved around 32,000 jobs
in SMEs (at unknown cost in
other sectors). The European
Union has co-financed some
ECU211 million, including
direct support of ECU86.1
million.
2.  Administrative procedures – including the filing of VAT-related forms – have
been simplified.
3.  Fifteen business service points were opened in September 1997. These are
managed by various ministries and aim to provide start-up grants that
motivate workers to become entrepreneurs. These grants are of limited
duration and are assessed and evaluated as the SME begins functioning.
In 1996 the Government released its white paper on Industry Policy, which
outlines in some detail how it intends to use industry policy to improve the
Finnish economy. The following sections draw on this document in outlining key
elements of the Finnish industry policy strategy.
TEKES Mission Statement
TEKES’ primary objective is to promote the
competitiveness of Finnish industry and the
service sector by technological means. Activities
should diversify production structures, increase
production and exports, and create a foundation
for employment and social well-being.
Main Functions
·  Framing and preparation of national
technology policy.
·  Preparing, financing and co-ordination
of national technology programmes.
·  Financing applied technical research
and risk-intensive industrial R&D
projects.
·  Financing and co-ordination of
international technological co-operation.
·  SME advisory services in technology
transfer and exploitation.79
1. Competition Policy
Barriers to competition have been removed to enable the smooth functioning of
competitive markets.
Unfair competition has been attacked through legislation, and cartels and the
abuse of dominant market positions have been prohibited. Finnish competition
policy also incorporates various European Union regulations that have been
designed to prevent the distortion of competition in the European market.
Included in the European Union regulations are merger controls that apply to
very large corporate takeovers, although Finland’s position on this seems (at
the time of the white paper) equivocal. The adoption of the Euro heralds new
competition in domestic finance, and this is expected to increase the Finnish
market share of foreign banks.
The Finns also apply regulations on competition to state-owned enterprises:
state institutions that are transformed into limited liability companies are subject
to all the normal regulations governing other enterprises, as well as policies
aimed at maintaining neutrality in the marketplace. However, the regulations
governing market operations of state-owned institutions are a little ambiguous –
an institution is expected to follow business principles when operating, but at
the same time the state is ultimately responsible for its borrowing. This is
exacerbated by general service objectives that allow state institutions to operate
in their (often sheltered) core business, while at the same time allowing them to
operate outside their core areas, competing in the open sector.
2. State Aid
Another aspect of competition policy that has been addressed in the 1990s is
state aid.
The Finns have been seeking to move away from direct aid towards the
creation of favourable general business conditions. This requires substantial
cuts to and refocusing of public subsidies. The Ministry of Trade and Industry is
over-seeing this task, and one of its main objectives is “the harmonisation of
corporate subsidies” by aiming at reducing overlap, distortions and complexity.
The initial step was a “severe pruning” of corporate subsidies – between 1995
and 1999 FIM1.9 billion (NZ$0.58 billion) was cut, mainly in the areas of
regional support (transport subsidies), energy subsidies, company
internationalisation support and interest subsidies for exports. At the same time
the amount directed towards technical R&D has remained fairly constant, and
as a result the share of these schemes has increased from 28% to 43% of all
Ministry of Trade and Industry subsidies.
Finland has attempted to make all subsidies that are not aimed at product
development – which seems to amount to regional aid – fund intangible80
investments. The exception – development subsidies – is intended to aid
internationalisation and support the development of SMEs on the basis that
“there is every reason to support the development of Finland’s economic
structure in a way that creates an abundance of new industrial and service
enterprises capable of exceeding the export threshold”.
The white paper acknowledges that “all corporate subsidies distort competition”
and attempts to recast the objective of state aid in a way that focuses on market
failures and encourages the development of projects that would otherwise not
be developed.
Although Finland accepts that there will be windfall gains where firms accept
subsidies for projects they would have undertaken anyway, greater targeting
through more precise eligibility criteria and fixed terms for support schemes is
expected to alleviate the problem somewhat. The evaluation of the success or
otherwise of projects is expected to play an important part in improving the
process.
One danger with corporate subsidies is that regional competition is generated
as cities or provinces or countries compete for a firm’s investment. Having
witnessed some of the excesses this “corporate welfare” has produced in the
United States, the European Union has been quite active in attempting to
ensure that member states refrain from such bidding wars with each other. The
Finns are enthusiastic about European Union attempts to prevent the
establishment of corporate welfare on the continent.
The main problem the white paper identifies with the Finnish system of
corporate subsidies is a perceived lack of coherence or “harmonisation”
between different subsidy programmes, especially given the increasing number
of European Union regulations that must be combined with Finnish policy. The
Ministry of Trade and Industry seems to be giving more attention to
harmonisation as part of the refocusing and simplifying of industry policy
generally.
3. R&D Policy
The Finns have moved from subsidising plants and equipment – as is often
done in regional industrial policy – in favour of supporting intangible R&D. The
Finnish authorities believe that this is where they can best assist, that without
some government support for these activities they will lose valuable spill-over
effects.
·  Finland pursues an active policy of assisting private sector R&D via grants
aimed at subsidising intangible investments, rather than capital items.
·  The Finnish authorities essentially “chip in” to approved private sector
projects to help encourage marginal investments.
·  They do not fully fund private sector research projects from the ground up.
·  Asset sales have been used to fund the increases in public sector R&D.81
·  The Finnish authorities aim for a 60/40 private/public split in R&D
spending, and to this end have recently upped their contribution in
response to increased private research investment.
·  The Finns attempt to target their subsidies fairly closely – imposing time
limits on grants and introducing review processes in order to monitor the
success or failure of particular programmes.
·  In addition, general research funding has been refocused in the 1990s to
strengthen support for scientific and technical programmes, with other
areas experiencing cuts.
·  Support is directed at viable competitive ventures, and this support is
reconsidered if the venture appears to be too reliant on government
support.
·  One primary concern is to fund projects that would not happen in the
absence of government support. There are two sorts of possible errors
here:
1.  The Government can fund projects that would have happened anyway
2.  The Government may not fund valuable projects that it should.
The New Zealand stance suggests we are more worried about the first sort of
error, while the Finnish position is clearly more concerned with avoiding the
second. The Finnish Government’s white paper on Industrial Policy (1996) does
address the first sort of error, but it believes that the incidence of these errors
can be decreased by careful targeting and review processes.
4. Venture capital for Research and development
Sitra, the Finnish National Fund for Research and Development, was
established in 1967 but made independent of the Bank of Finland in 1991. It is
an independent public fund responsible to the Finnish Parliament. Its operations
are financed through income from endowment capital (FIM2.9 billion (ECU0.5
billion, NZ$0.88 billion)) and the return on the investment operations.
The primary aim behind Sitra is to “facilitate Finland’s social and economic
adaptation to international changes, chart and present new strategic
alternatives to increase the competitiveness of the Finnish economy, as well as
to identify, develop and test new instruments with an impact on the country’s
competitiveness”.
In order to achieve this, Sitra provides finances and implementation for
nationally significant research, training and innovative projects. Sitra also
invests in technology companies and funds both in Finland and abroad.
Sitra finances economically promising, small-sized technology firms. This is
aimed at promoting firms’ development and internationalisation. Sitra operates
as a venture capital firm, and sees one of its roles as introducing new operative
models to Finland, promoting competence and expertise in the field.
Sitra also invests in international technology funds. They constitute a part of
Sitra’s co-operation network and provide Finnish technology companies with an82
opportunity to find international partners and financiers. The co-operation
network has been created in geographical areas that are vital to Finnish
technology firms, including not only the European Union and the US, but also
Finland’s neighbouring areas.
5. State Ownership
Several guidelines have been laid down for the operation of Finnish state-
owned enterprises:
·  Enterprises should be profitable, once they are well established, and they
should not maintain production which is not going to be profitable in the
long term.
·  Enterprises should avoid becoming excessively leveraged.
·  Enterprises should pay a dividend corresponding to normal business
practice.
·  Enterprises should work under the same conditions as relevantly similar
enterprises and are not allowed to abuse their special position in
competition.
·  If special conditions are placed on state-owned enterprises they must be
compensated for the costs these conditions bring.
·  For the purposes of public subsidies, state-owned and privately owned
enterprises are treated the same.
In addition, Finland has in the 1990s embarked on a programme of asset sales,
divesting the Government of mature businesses that can operate in an open,
competitive economy and that are not correcting for market failures. Funds from
the sale of state-owned enterprises are being used to finance a large and
permanent increase in state-sponsored R&D.
The composition of the governing authorities of many state-owned enterprises
is being reviewed with the intention of ensuring that efficiency and expertise
relevant to the operation of the enterprise are emphasised in its management.
6. Financial Markets
The banking sector in Finland is expected to face considerable competition in
the wake of European Monetary Union. The banking sector in Finland does not
seem to have been as well developed or as efficient as the banking sector in
other countries, and there seems to be widespread concern about the ability of
Finnish banks to remain competitive in the wake of monetary union.
7. Energy Policy
Finland’s industry has for a long time been energy intensive; the share of its
energy-intensive sectors has remained high at around 30% of total industry.83
The demand for energy is also growing at the moment, and there seem to be
concerns about possible future shortfalls.  This is being addressed by the
introduction of active measures and financial incentives that reward energy
conservation.  In 1997 the Government altered energy taxation to encourage
more frugal use of electricity and oil (remember that the bilateral trade
agreements with the Soviet Union shielded the Finns from the pro-conservation
effects of the oil shocks as well as the more hurtful price shocks).
The energy markets are also being made more competitive by increasing
competition and by addressing monopolistic practices where they occur. The
Government is “committed to safeguarding an adequate supply of energy and to
promote energy saving, primarily through market mechanisms”. In addition, the
Government is promoting research into (price-competitive) alternative sources
of energy.
8. Environmental Policy
Finland’s environmental policy is being integrated into its industrial policy, and it
is enthusiastic about moving from an industry-based society to a knowledge-
based society.  This is partly because it signifies a shift away from the
unsustainable exploitation of natural resources and a shift towards more
environmentally-friendly forms of work.
The Finnish authorities support the harmonisation of environmental taxes
(including energy taxes) within the European Union, and believe that these
taxes should assist the development of new sectors rather than prevent them.
However, Finland is in a somewhat different position from New Zealand as far
as the environment is concerned; biodiversity is more of an issue for New
Zealand, where many of our indigenous flora and fauna reside nowhere else in
the world.
9. Regional Policy
The northern and eastern parts of Finland have proved slower to develop than
other regions, and Finnish authorities are keen to ensure these areas are not
left behind.
In addition to the use of European Union structural funds (Finland was eligible
for around 2 billion Markka (NZ$0.6 billion) in 1997), the Finnish Government
has established a national rural programme designed to safeguard balanced
rural development and revitalise rural areas “by increasing the income of their
inhabitants, by improving the functioning of services and rural communities and
particularly by strengthening the competitiveness and attractiveness of these
areas as places to live and carry out business activities”.84
10. Administration of Industrial Policy
Finland has an active and comprehensive approach to industrial policy, but also
needs to be mindful of limitations and incentives placed on its policy by
European Union membership.  Because of this it is currently seeking to
harmonise its policies as much as possible to improve its international
competitiveness and identify and destroy toxic incentives, double-ups and other
undesirable policy implications. This is an ongoing task.
11. Development of the Service Sector
The high-tech service sector has basically been responsible for much of
Finland’s growth over the last 20 years. Its employment share (as well as the
output share) is also very high – every second Finn works in the sector. The
Finnish authorities are anxious to integrate the continuing growth of the service
sector with the important manufacturing sector. Because many of Finland’s
exports and services make use of high-technology processes, the Finnish
Government is attempting to encourage synergies between the two sectors.
About 15% of Finnish R&D funding is channelled into “knowledge-based
services” that comprise engineering, information technology, “well-being
services” and tourism. Approximately 25% of the TEKES budget goes into
information technology, and this is seen as an area offering higher than usual
returns on investment.
12. Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
Finland sees the development of SMEs as a central part of its industry policy.
They have become increasingly important in the Finnish economy over the last
decade; those with fewer than 250 employees account for about 42% of GDP
and about 60% of the private sector labour force (40% of all jobs).
One – probably very significant – advantage Finnish SMEs enjoy over their New
Zealand counterparts is their proximity and access to large, integrated markets.
Although most Finnish SMEs have a domestic focus, the European Union
market provides an opportunity for small firms to go international without the
regulatory, tariff, geographic or cultural barriers New Zealand firms may have to
overcome when they attempt to become export firms.
In spite of the fact that SMEs are often innovative, they often have difficulty
carrying out research and development owing to their lack of resources.
Additionally, financiers often see small firms as risky and this can make it hard
to attract low cost finance. However, the Finns see SMEs as fundamental to the
country’s economic performance and the Ministry for Trade and Industry and
the Council for SMEs have been working to help these businesses in start-up,
growth and operation by reducing compliance and labour costs, reviewing the
implications of the tax code for SMEs and improving financing arrangements for
small businesses.85
13. Agriculture and Forestry
The white paper on Industrial Policy acknowledges that agriculture in Finland
suffers from permanent disadvantages: “Due to Finland’s northern location,
transportation costs are greater, harvests are poorer and construction costs are
higher than in most other European Union countries. This results in a
permanent competitive handicap for agriculture…” which the Finns attempt to
ameliorate by direct income subsidies and by diversifying the production and
service base of rural areas and farms.
The forestry sector is one of Finland’s traditional strengths and has contributed
strongly to the recovery over recent years. The industry employs around
100,000 people, with around 140,000 indirectly employed in associated
occupations.
Forestry has proved important in regional development in recent years – parts
of the country that may otherwise have been left behind in the last 20 or so
years. The sector was of fundamental importance in the recovery of recent
years, and played a substantial part in ensuring that the gains from the recovery
were broadly distributed.
In the last decade forestry policy has been revised to ensure greater
sustainability and diversity.86
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Comparing Finland and New Zealand
Finland has enjoyed consistently higher GDP per capita growth than New
Zealand since the end of the Second World War, but especially since about
1970. Although this may be partially due to New Zealand’s higher population
growth over the period, there is evidence that total Finnish output has grown at
considerably higher average rates than New Zealand’s.
Since the recession, Finland has grown at an even faster rate – 5% per annum
since 1994 – but much of this growth has been cyclical rebound in the wake of a
very deep recession that occurred between 1990 and 1993. The 1994-99
growth is probably not sustainable – recent growth rates are expected to taper
off somewhat once the Finns have fully recovered from the experience of the
early 1990s.
During the recession, unemployment rose from 3.5% to 18% in Finland between
1990 and 1993. It has since declined to around 10% and is experienced
disproportionately by older, less skilled workers.
During the recession, Finnish debt levels rose dramatically, from around 15% of
GDP to around 60%. In the last few years this has tapered off – the Finns have
used proceeds from asset sales to pay back debt. Now that they have lost
monetary policy as an instrument, fiscal consolidation is expected to be used to
tighten demand in the Finnish economy.
In terms of productivity, the growth in output per worker achieved in Finland has
substantially outstripped that achieved in New Zealand since 1960, by
increasing amounts as time has passed.
Strong growth in manufacturing has helped Finland’s economy since the war.
As well as traditionally strong areas associated with the forestry sector,
shipbuilding and engineering industries have grown strongly, probably in part
because of the seeding these industries received as a result of the payment of
war reparations to the Soviet Union.
Bilateral trade agreements with the Soviet Union provided a counter-cyclical
balance for the Finnish economy during the 1970s and 1980s, as the Finns
could expand exports to the Soviet Union as part of the trade arrangements
during periods of recession in other Finnish export markets.
Finland has been well integrated in the European economy for the entire post-
war period – although arrangements with the Soviet Union limited Finland
politically, the Finns were free to trade with anyone.87
The collapse of Soviet trade arrangements at the start of this decade
contributed to the massive recession experienced by Finland between 1990 and
1993.
Finnish firms have been successful in diversifying their markets in the 1990s, to
the extent that the European Union share of Finnish exports has actually
decreased since Finland joined in 1993, while the total volume of exports has
risen considerably (from US$1.95 billion in 1994 to US$3.6 billion in 1998).
The growth of Nokia Corporation has also contributed to recent Finnish growth.
In fact, most of the astounding growth in telecommunications and electronics in
Finland in the 1990s has been because of this firm or its affiliates. Nokia’s
growth has been formidable – 25% per annum since 1994 – but it is difficult to
generalise Nokia’s success to that of Finnish manufacturing in general.  It is
certainly impossible to attribute it to public policy, although the liberalisation of
telecommunications in Nordic countries is often cited as a reason for the
success of both Ericsson and Nokia.
Finland’s industrial production in the telecommunications sector was about 16
times higher in 1997 than it was in 1987. This sector now accounts for around
16% of all industrial output in Finland, and is primarily an export industry.
High-tech exports accounted for 19% of total Finnish exports in 1998. The share
of high-tech products within total exports has increased almost four-fold in the
last 10 years, from around 5% to 19%. This is a considerably faster rate of
growth than that experienced in comparable countries.
Elements of Finnish Economic Strategy
Finnish economic policy has more constraints on it than does New Zealand’s.
Harmonisation with European Union policies constrains Finland to a far greater
extent than do New Zealand’s relationships with other countries.
Finland is moving in the same broad direction as New Zealand inasmuch as it is
attempting to:
·  integrate into a regional economy
·  promote macroeconomic stability
·  encourage the growth of a competitive private sector
·  build a knowledge-based skills base
·  promote openness and international linkages
·  foster social cohesion.
Although Finland has also reformed parts of its public sector in a similar
direction to the New Zealand (such as through a programme of asset sales),
there are also significant differences (for example, wage setting tends to be
carried out centrally in Finland).88
One factor that seems central to Finnish success is education – the Finns
perform well on international literacy and numeracy tests, and are in the
process of reforming their tertiary education system to become more responsive
to the needs of their economy.  At the same time they are encouraging younger
students to take an interest in the natural sciences (in spite of very high
numbers of engineers and scientists in Finland, demand still exceeds supply).
Industry policy
The success of Finland’s high technology sector poses an interesting challenge
for New Zealand.  How much of Finland’s success is due to a different policy
mix?  The Finnish Government does not spend much more than New Zealand
on R&D, however, it pursues an active policy of encouraging
industry/Government joint ventures.  Private sector spending on R&D is many
times higher in Finland than in New Zealand.
Other policy stances may also have contributed.  As in New Zealand, the Nordic
countries have liberalised telecommunications and this is often cited for the
success of both Ericsson and Nokia.  Finland also boosts a well-educated
workforce with a higher concentration of engineering and science graduates.
Finland is now encouraging more commerce graduates to develop the
marketing and management skills required for further expansion.
Policy making and social capital
Another policy lesson that comes through quite clearly is the focus on
coordination, consensus-building and evaluation of policy.
The Finns seem very adept at accomplishing different aspects of a single goal
through quite different policy mechanisms. For example, the goal to make
Finland an information society involves aspects of:
·  education policy (generously funded tertiary education, an emphasis on
academic quality, entrepreneurship and technical areas)
·  R&D funding (via TEKES, Sitra, the Academy of Finland)
·  tax and employment policy (lowering the compliance costs for small
businesses)
·  agricultural policy (attempting to make up for “permanent disadvantages”
through the clever use of advanced food technology).
The variety of instruments used by the Finns to accomplish their goals is
impressive in its breadth, although with a public service as large as theirs the
need to keep everything from becoming unwieldy becomes paramount.
Consensus-building seems another feature of the Finnish policy – and
especially political – landscape. The parties forming the Government regularly
represent more than 70% of Finnish voters, probably enabling them to debate
policy subtleties in a more sophisticated way than is possible in more89
adversarial systems. High social capital or trust is likely to be a significant
feature in this.
The Finns also seem eager to stand back and evaluate policy so they can
minimise errors. This is illustrated in their approach to R&D, where a high
premium is placed on evaluating the success or otherwise of their policies.
One of the primary drivers behind Finland’s increasing focus on high-technology
products has been export diversification. Since the crisis, and in particular since
the collapse of trade with the Soviet Union, Finland has increasingly looked to
shift away from capital-intensive, conventional modes of production to
knowledge-intensive industries.
In the end, it is hard to say whether Finland’s recent success in high
technology– was a fortunate accident, or the product of a different policy and
cultural environment.  There may be lessons to learn from Finland’s approach to
education and R&D policy.  In particular, the Finnish approach of experimenting
with different policy settings, and carefully evaluating their effect is instructive.
Finland’s overall economic strategy bears a close resemblance to that of New
Zealand.  In some areas, New Zealand has already moved ahead on issues
that Finland is now addressing (for example, fiscal consolidation).  In other
areas, Finland is generating better outcomes (for example education policy).
This suggests that differences in economic performance between New Zealand
and Finland are driven more strongly by cultural and perhaps geographical
features, and historical antecedents, rather than contrasting policy approaches.90









































APPENDIX 2: FINNISH INHERITANCE AND GIFT TAXATION
Tax on Inheritances
Tax on inheritances is imposed on the individual share of each beneficiary.
Liability to the tax covers any property if the deceased or the heir or the receiver
of a bequest is a resident of Finland. If both the deceased and the heir are non-
residents, tax liability covers only real property which is situated in Finland, and
shares in a corporate body in which more than 50% of the assets consist of
Finnish real property.
The inheritance tax is based on the market value of the property inherited as
per date of death. Insurance payments owing to death to a beneficiary or to the
estate are partly subject to inheritance tax, unless the payment is subject to
income taxation. Debts are deductible, as well as costs for the funeral.
If the same property has been transferred as inheritance twice or more within
two years, tax is levied only once.
If inheritance tax has been paid in a foreign country, the tax will be credited
against Finnish tax, unless the foreign tax was imposed on real property
situated in Finland.
Finland has concluded agreements to avoid double taxation on inheritance with
the following states:





Tax agreements take precedence over internal rules for property subject to tax
and over rules for avoiding double taxation.
Gift Tax
Gift tax follows the same principles with small deviations and amendments as
tax on inheritance. In gift taxation, gifts from the same donor within three years
are accumulated for the purpose of determining the amount of tax. There is an
agreement for avoidance of double taxation of gifts between the Nordic
countries. With Greece there is an agreement covering only donations of real
property.
Tax on inheritance and gift is based on the Inheritance and Gift Tax Act. The
same tax rates apply for both inheritances and gifts. Recipients are divided into
three categories, the tax being twice and correspondingly thrice the amount in
the first category.92
The first category includes following relationships:
·  Spouse
·  Children and their direct heirs
·  Parents.
The second category is applied to siblings and their descendants. Other
relationships fall under category three.
Tax rates in the first category (FIM):




20,000-100,000 500 10 %
100,000-300,000 8500 13 %
300,000 or more 34,500 16 %
Real Property Tax
Real property that is situated in Finland is subject to real property tax. The
revenue goes to the municipality where the real property is situated. Land used
in forestry or agriculture is exempted from real property tax.
Tax is paid annually by the person who was the owner of the real property at
the beginning of the year.
Real property tax is based on the taxable value of the real property. Tax rates
may vary in different municipalities between 0.2% and 0.8%. The rate for
permanent residences is half the normal rate.93
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